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One year shy of the fiftieth anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education, 1 
the Justices issued another equality ruling that is likely to become a histori­
cal landmark.2 In Lawrence v. Texas,3 the Court invalidated a state law that 
criminalized same-sex sodomy. This article contrasts these historic rulings 
along several dimensions, with the aim of shedding light on how Supreme 
Court Justices decide cases and how Court decisions influence social reform 
movements. 
Part I juxtaposes Brown and Lawrence to illustrate how judicial deci­
sionmaking often involves an uneasy reconciliation of traditional legal 
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ful to Daryl Levinson, Liz Magill, Bill Rubenstein, Jim Ryan, Mike Seidman, and Bill Stuntz for 
comments on an earlier draft. I also benefited from feedback offered at faculty workshops at Har­
vard Law School, Northwestern University School of Law, Villanova School of Law, University of 
Virginia School of Law, Washington & Lee School of Law, the third annual constitutional law con­
ference at the Harvard Law School, the legal history colloquium run by Stuart Banner at the UCLA 
School of Law, and a graduate students' workshop run by Howard Gillman at USC. I am also grate­
ful for the insightful suggestions made by students at the University of Virginia School of Law, 
where I presented an early version of the ideas contained in this article at a forum sponsored by the 
American Constitution Society and the Lambda Law Alliance. The reference librarians at Virginia, 
and especially Ben Doherty and Kent Olson, provided their usual spectacular assistance with the 
research. Meghan Cloud improved the prose with her deft editorial touch. Elizabeth Kim, Jessica 
King, and Asieh N ariman provided helpful research assistance. 
I dedicate this Article to the memory of my mother, Muriel Klarman (1929-2004). 
I. 347 U.S. 483 (1954 ). 
2. See E.J. Graff, The High Court Finally Gets It Right, BosTON GLOBE, June 29, 2003, at 
DI I (observing that "Lawrence is our Brown v. Board of Education"); Evan Thomas, The War over 
Gay Marriage, NEWSWEEK, July 7, 2003, at 38, 40 (quoting legal scholar David Garrow calling 
Lawrence, along with Brown, "one of the two most important opinions of the last JOO years"). 
3. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
431 
432 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 104:431 
sources with broader social and political mores and the personal values of 
the judges. Part II considers what these landmark decisions teach us about 
the relationship between Supreme Court decisions and movements for social 
reform. Part III examines the light these rulings shed on the strategic aspect 
of judicial decisionmaking: how courts sometimes temper their decisions in 
light of political constraints. Part IV considers the consequences of Brown 
and Lawrence (and Goodridge v. Department of Public Health4) and, espe­
cially, the political backlashes they ignited. Part V analyzes the rulings from 
the perspective of Supreme Court Justices attempting to predict the future. A 
brief conclusion speculates as to what such decisions-and history's verdict 
upon them-teach us about the source of the Supreme Court's legitimacy. 
I. WHY BROWN AND LAWRENCE WERE HARD CASES 
Legal scholars and political scientists have long debated how to under­
stand judicial decisionmaking.5 One school, that of the "formalists," argues 
that judges decide cases by interpreting legal sources, such as texts (statutes 
and constitutions), the original understanding of such documents, and legal 
precedents. According to an extreme version of this view, judges engaged in 
constitutional adjudication "lay the article of the Constitution which is in­
voked beside the statute which is challenged and . . .  decide whether the 
latter squares with the former."6 In its more moderate (and more plausible) 
form, formalism holds that judicial decisionmaking is significantly con­
strained by legal sources such as text, original understanding, and precedent, 
even though some room for judicial discretion remains. 7 A competing 
school, that of the "realists" or the "attitudinalists," argues that judicial in­
terpretation mainly reflects the personal values of judges.8 In its crudest 
form, this perspective explains judicial decisionmaking as a reflection of 
what the judge ate for breakfast.9 In its subtler (and more plausible) form, 
4. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
5 .  For an excellent summary of the current status of this debate within the political science 
community, see Howard Gillman, What's Law Got to Do with It? Judicial Behavioralists Test the 
"Legal Model" of Judicial Decision Making, 26 LAW. & Soc. INQUIRY 465 (2001). 
6. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 ( 1936). 
7. For examples of law professors defending the moderate formalist position, see, for ex­
ample, Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1975), and Frederick Schauer, Easy 
Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 399 (1985). For examples of political scientists emphasizing the impor­
tance of the legal component in judicial decisionmaking, see SUPREME CouRT DECISION-MAKING: 
NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES (Cornell w. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999) [hereinaf­
ter SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING] and LEE EPSTEIN & JosEPH F. KOBYLKA, THE SUPREME 
COURT AND LEGAL CHANGE: ABORTION AND THE DEATH PENALTY 299-312 (1992). 
8. For leading modem variants of the realist view, see JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. 
SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 208-60 (1993); Jeffrey A. Segal & 
Alfred D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. PoL. Sc1. 
REV. 557 ( 1989); and Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of lnterpretivism 
and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983). 
9. See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930); Joseph c. Hutcheson, Jr., The 
Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274 
(1929). 
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this view is encapsulated in a famous statement by Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes: "The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political 
theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the preju­
dices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more 
to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be 
govemed."10 Brown and Lawrence demonstrate the extent to which judicial 
decisionmaking is influenced by nonlegal factors. 1 1  
Most people today would be surprised to learn that Brown was a hard 
case for the Justices: If state-mandated segregation in public schools is not 
unconstitutional, what is? That the ruling in Brown was unanimous, more­
over, suggests that the Justices found the case to be easy. Yet appearances 
can be deceptive. In fact, the Justices were at first deeply divided on how to 
resolve Brown. 12 
In a memorandum to the files that he dictated the day Brown was de­
cided, Justice William 0. Douglas observed that a vote taken after the case 
was first argued in December 1 952 would have been "five to four in favor of 
the constitutionality of segregation in the public schools."13 Justice Felix 
Frankfurter's head count was only slightly different: He reported that a vote 
taken at that time would have been five to four to invalidate segregation, 
with the majority writing several opinions. 14 
Brown was difficult for many of the Justices because it posed a conflict 
between their legal views and their personal values. The sources of constitu­
tional interpretation to which they ordinarily looked for guidance-text, 
original understanding, precedent, and custom-indicated that school segre­
gation was permissible. By contrast, most of the Justices privately 
condemned segregation, which Justice Hugo Black called "Hitler's creed."15 
Their quandary was how to reconcile their legal and moral views. 
Frankfurter's preferred approach to adjudication required that he sepa­
rate his personal views from the law. He preached that judges must decide 
cases based upon "the compulsions of governing legal principles,"16 not "the 
10. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. , THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). 
11. For elaboration of this claim about the nature of judicial decisionmaking, see MICHAEL J. 
KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RA­
CIAL EQUALITY 4-6, 292-312, 446-54 (2004). 
12. For a more complete discussion of the Justices' internal deliberations in Brown, see id. at 
292-312. 
13. Memorandum from William 0. Douglas, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Segre­
gation Cases file (May 17, 1954) (on file with the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, 
Douglas Papers, Box 1150). 
14. Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Stanley Reed, 
Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (May 20, 1954) (on file with the University of Kentucky, Reed 
Papers). 
15. THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940-1985): THE PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS BEHIND 
NEARLY 300 SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 639 (Del Dickson ed., 2001) [hereinafter THE SUPREME 
COURT IN CONFERENCE] (reproducing the April 8, 1950, conference discussion in Mclaurin v. 
Okla. State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950)). 
16. Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to William 0. Doug­
las, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Nov. 19, 1942) (on file with the Library of Congress, 
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idiosyncrasies of a merely personal judgment."17 In a memorandum he wrote 
in conjunction with the first flag-salute case in 1940, 18 Frankfurter noted that 
"[n]o duty of judges is more important nor more difficult to discharge than 
that of guarding against reading their personal and debatable opinions into 
the [ c ]ase."19 
That Frankfurter abhorred racial segregation cannot be doubted; his per­
sonal behavior clearly demonstrated his egalitarian commitments. In the 
1930s he had served on the legal committee of the National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People ("NAACP"), and in 1948 he had hired 
the Court's first black law clerk, William Coleman, Jr.20 Nonetheless, he in­
sisted that his personal views were of limited relevance to the legal question 
of whether segregation was constitutional: "However passionately any of us 
may hold egalitarian views, however fiercely any of us may believe that 
such a policy of segregation . . .  is both unjust and shortsighted . . . .  [h]e 
travels outside his judicial authority if for this private reason alone, he de­
clares [it] unconstitutional."2 1  The Court could invalidate segregation, 
Frankfurter believed, only if it was legally as well as morally objectionable. 
Yet Frankfurter had difficulty finding a compelling legal argument for 
striking down segregation. His law clerk, Alexander Bickel, spent a summer 
reading the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment, and he re­
ported to Frankfurter that it was "impossible" to conclude that its supporters 
had intended or even foreseen the abolition of school segregation.22 To be 
sure, Frankfurter believed that the meaning of constitutional concepts can 
change over time,23 but as he and his colleagues deliberated, public schools 
in twenty-one states and the District of Columbia were still segregated. He 
could thus hardly maintain that evolving social standards condemned the 
practice. Furthermore, judicial precedent, which Frankfurter called "the 
most influential factor in giving a society coherence and continuity,"24 
Douglas Papers), quoted in MELVIN I. UROFSKY, DIVISION AND DISCORD: THE SUPREME COURT 
UNDER STONE AND VINSON, 1941- 1953, at 1 30 (1997) [hereinafter UROFSKY, DIVISION AND DIS­
CORD]. 
1 7. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
18. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). 
19. UROFSKY, DIVISION AND DISCORD, supra note 16, at 109 n.112 (quoting an undated 
memorandum in Justice Frankfurter's handwriting found in the files on the flag salute cases). 
20. UROFSKY, DIVISION AND DISCORD, supra note 16, at 260; MELVIN I. UROFSKY, FELIX 
FRANKFURTER: JUDICIAL RESTRAINT AND INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES 128-29 (1991) [hereinafter UROF­
SKY, JUDICIAL RESTRAINT]. 
21. Memorandum (first draft) from Felix Frankfurter (undated), microfonned on Frankfurter 
Papers, pt. 2, reel 4, frame 378 (Univ. Publ'ns of Am. 1986)). 
22. Memorandum from Alexander M. Bickel, Law Clerk, to Felix Frankfurter, Assoc. Jus­
tice, U.S. Supreme Court (Aug. 22, 1953), microfonned on Frankfurter Papers, pt. 2, reel 4, frames 
212-14 (Univ. Publ'ns of Am. 1986). 
23. UROFSKY, DIVISION AND DISCORD, supra note 1 6, at 217-18, 222. 
24. MARY FRANCES BERRY, STABILITY, SECURITY, AND CONTINUITY: MR. JUSTICE BURTON 
AND DECISION MAKING IN THE SUPREME COURT 1945-1958, at 142 (1978) (quoting Memorandum 
of Felix Frankfurter, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Conference (Dec. 20, 195 1 )  (on file 
with the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Burton Papers, no. 195, Box 238). 
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strongly supported it. Of forty-four challenges to school segregation adjudi­
cated by state arspellate and federal courts between 1865 and 1935, not one 
had succeeded. 5 Indeed, on the basis of legislative history and precedent, 
Frankfurter had to concede that "Plessy is right."26 
Brown presented a similar dilemma for Justice Robert H. Jackson, who 
also found segregation anathema. In a 1950 letter, Jackson, who had left the 
Court during the 1945-1946 term to prosecute Nazis at Nuremberg, wrote to 
a friend: "You and I have seen the terrible consequences of racial hatred in 
Germany. We can have no sympathy with racial conceits which underlie 
segregation policies."27 Yet, like Frankfurter, Jackson thought that judges 
were obliged to separate their personal views from the law, and he was loath 
to overrule precedent.28 
Jackson revealed his internal struggles in a draft concurring opinion that 
began: "Decision of these cases would be simple if our personal opinion that 
school segregation is morally, economically or politically indefensible made 
it legally so."29 But because Jackson believed that judges must subordinate 
their personal preferences to the law, this consideration was irrelevant. 
When he turned to the question of whether existing law condemned segrega­
tion, he had difficulty answering in the affirmative: 
Layman as well as lawyer must query how it is that the Constitution this 
morning forbids what for three-quarters of a century it has tolerated or ap­
proved. 
Convenient as it would be to reach an opposite conclusion, I simply cannot 
find in the conventional material of constitutional interpretation any justifi­
cation for saying that in maintaining segregated schools any state or the 
District of Columbia can be judicially decreed, up to the date of this deci­
sion, to have violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 30 
That the nine Justices who initially considered Brown would be uneasy 
about invalidating segregation is unsurprising. All of them had been ap­
pointed by Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman on the 
25. Edith Udell Fierst, Note, Constitutionality of Educational Segregation, 17 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 208, 214 n.30 (1949). 
26. Douglas Conference Notes, Nos. 2 & 4, Briggs v. Elliott, Dec. 12, 1953 (on file with the 
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Douglas Papers, Box 1150). 
27. Letter from Robert H. Jackson, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Charles Fairman, 
Professor, Stanford University 2 (Mar. 13, 1950) (on file with Library of Congress, Jackson Papers, 
Fairman file, Box 12). 
28. United States v. S.E. Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 5 33, 589-95 (1944) (Jackson, J., 
dissenting); Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371, 403-04 (1943); Gregory S. Chernack, The Clash 
of Two Worlds: Justice Robert H. Jackson, Institutional Pragmatism, and Brown, 72 TEMPLE L. REv. 
51, 52 ( 1 999); Dwight J. Simpson, Robert H. Jackson and the Doctrine of Judicial Restraint, 3 
UCLA L. REV. 325, 326-30, 338-41 (1956). 
29. Robert H. Jackson, Draft Memorandum, School Segregation Cases 1 (Mar. 15 ,  1 954) (on 
file with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Jackson Papers, Segregation Cases, Box 184). 
30. Id. at 5, 10. 
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assumption that they supported, as Jackson put it, "the doctrine on which the 
Roosevelt fight against the old court was based-in part, that it had ex­
panded the Fourteenth Amendment to take an unjustified judicial control 
over social and economic affairs."3 1 For most of their professional lives, 
these men had criticized untethered judicial activism as undemocratic-the 
invalidation of the popular will by unelected officeholders who were inscrib­
ing their social and economic biases onto the Constitution. This is how all 
nine of them understood the Lochner32 era, when the Court had invalidated 
protective labor legislation on a thin constitutional basis. The question in 
Brown, as Jackson's law clerk William H. Rehnquist noted, was whether 
invalidating school segregation would eliminate any distinction between this 
Court and its predecessor, except for "the kinds of litigants it favors and the 
kinds of special claims it protects."33 
Thus, several Justices wondered whether the Court was the right institu­
tion to forbid segregation. Several expressed views similar to Vinson's: If 
segregation was to be condemned, "it would be better if [Congress] would 
act."34 Jackson cautioned that "[h]owever desirable it may be to abolish edu­
cational segregation, we cannot, with a proper sense of responsibility, ignore 
the question whether the use of the judicial office to initiate law reforms that 
cannot get enough national public support to put them through Congress, is 
our own constitutional function."35 If the Court had to decide the question, 
Jackson lamented, "then representative government ha[ d] failed."36 
***** 
Until the current Justices' conference notes and memoranda are made 
public, one cannot be certain as to what internal conflicts they may have 
experienced in Lawrence.37 Still, it is likely that at least some of the Justices 
in the majority found Lawrence hard-and for pretty much the same reasons 
that several Justices were conflicted over Brown. 
Lawrence, like Brown, required the Justices to overturn a precedent­
Bowers v.  Hardwick38-and a fairly recent one at that. Three of the six Jus­
tices who voted to invalidate the Texas same-sex sodomy statute-Sandra 
31 . Letter from Jackson to Fairman, supra note 27, at 2. 
32. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) .  
33. Memorandum of WHR (William H. Rehnquist), A Random Thought on the Segregation 
Cases (on file with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Jackson Papers, Box 1 84). 
34. Harold H. Burton, Conference Notes, Segregation Cases (Dec. 13, 1952) (on file with 
Library of Congress, Burton Papers, Box 244). 
35. Robert H. Jackson, Draft Concurrence, School Segregation Cases 7 (Dec. 7, 1953) (on 
file with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Jackson Papers, Segregation Cases, Box 1 84 ).  
36. William 0. Douglas, Conference Notes, Briggs v. Elliott and Davis v. County School 
Board (Dec. 1 2, 1953) (on file with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Douglas Papers, 
Segregation Cases, Box 1 149). 
37. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
38. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
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Day O'Connor, Anthony Kennedy, and David Souter-had co-authored the 
plurality opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey,39 which stressed the importance of precedent to the rule of law: "Lib­
erty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt."40 As Justice Antonin Scalia 
pointed out in his Lawrence dissent, the treatments of precedent in Casey 
and Lawrence are-to put it mildly-in some tension with one another.41 
Moreover, Lawrence, like Brown, adopts an interpretation of the Four­
teenth Amendment that significantly departs from its original understanding. 
The thirty-ninth Congress was no more committed to protecting gay rights 
than it was to barring school segregation.42 
Further, because Justices Kennedy and O'Connor generally disfavor 
identifying new fundamental rights or suspect classes,43 both of their opin­
ions in Lawrence rule the Texas statute deficient without applying a 
heightened standard of review.44 Yet invalidating the law under minimum 
rationality review is difficult to justify, given the extreme deference the 
Court has traditionally shown when applying that standard.45 Until 1961  
39. 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion). 
40. Id. at 844. 
41. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 587 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of being "ma­
nipulative in invoking the doctrine" of stare decisis and criticizing its failure to distinguish Casey's 
treatment of precedent); see Jeffrey Rosen, Immodest Proposal: Massachusetts Gets It Wrong on 
Gay Marriage, NEW RE PUBLIC, Dec. 22, 2003, at 19 [hereinafter Rosen, Immodest Proposal] (criti­
cizing the "cavalier treatment of precedent" in Lawrence). 
42. On the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment with regard to school segre­
gation, see Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to 
Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REv. 1881 (1995). 
43. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 736-37 (1997) (O'Connor, J., con­
curring) (concluding "that there is no generalized right to 'commit suicide' " but leaving open "the 
question whether suffering patients have a constitutionally cognizable interest in obtaining relief 
from the suffering that they may experience in the last days of their lives"); Romer v. Evans, 517 
U.S. 620 (1996) (invalidating under minimum rationality review Colorado's constitutional amend­
ment denying protected status to homosexuals and declining to rule that homosexuality is a suspect 
status or that any fundamental right was implicated here); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 
750-51 (1987) (Rehnquist, C.J., writing for the majority, in an opinion in which O'Connor, J., 
joined) (refusing to hold that a right against pretrial detention is " 'so rooted in the traditions and 
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental' " (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 
U.S. 97, 105 (1934))); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 242-54 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting, joined 
by O'Connor, J.) (denying that illegal aliens are a suspect class or that education is a fundamental 
right). 
44. Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword: Loving Lawrence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1447, 1449-50 
(2004) (noting that the majority opinion in Lawrence fails to state what level of scrutiny it is apply­
ing to the Texas statute); Nelson Lund & John 0. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris, 
102 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1 578 (2004) (same). 
45. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961) (noting that the Equal Pro­
tection Clause is "offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the 
achievement of the State's objective"); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488-89 (1955) 
(applying an extremely deferential standard under minimum rationality review). 
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every state in the nation had a law forbidding same-sex sodomy.46 It strains 
credulity to suggest that all those states were acting irrationally.4 7 
Finally, Kennedy and O'Connor reveal discomfort with the stated ra­
tionales underlying their opinions by insisting on limiting their reach by fiat. 
Kennedy insists that the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause "pre­
sumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, 
expression, and certain intimate conduct."48 O'Connor both portrays the 
Texas statute as motivated by simple animus or hatred and rejects "moral 
disapproval" as a legitimate government purpose.49 Yet both Justices caution 
that other laws disadvantaging gays and lesbians-for example, bans on 
same-sex marriage-would not necessarily be susceptible to those objec­
tions. 50 They offer no convincing bases for drawing such a distinction, 
however, and Scalia powerfully charges in dissent that "only if one enter­
tains the belief that principle and logic have nothin� to do with the decisions 
of this Court" can such a distinction be maintained. ' 
One cannot know for sure, but Lawrence probably presented the same 
conflict between law and personal values for Justices Kennedy and 
O'Connor that Brown did for Justices Frankfurter and Jackson.52 Kennedy 
and O'Connor were likely offended by the criminal prosecution of private, 
consensual, adult sexual activity; even Justice Thomas, who dissented, 
thought the statute "uncommonly silly."53 Yet, Kennedy's and O'Connor's 
favored approaches to constitutional interpretation revealed no obvious legal 
flaws in the Texas statute. 
That the opinions in Brown and Lawrence rely partially on unconven­
tional legal sources supports the notion that some of the Justices found the 
cases difficult. Brown's famous footnote 1 1  invoked social science evidence 
to show that racial segregation in grade school education generated feelings 
of inferiority among blacks. The use of such evidence in a Supreme Court 
opinion was virtually unprecedented, the particular evidence invoked was 
deeply flawed, and the left-wing political credentials of some of the aca-
46. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 193 ( 1986). 
47. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority 
for applying "an unheard-of form of rational-basis review"); id. at 604 (accusing the majority of 
"having laid waste the foundations of our rational-basis jurisprudence"). 
48. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562. 
49. Id. at 580-81 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
50. Id. at 578; id. at 585 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
5 1 .  Id. at 605 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
52. Cf Cass Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, and 
Marriage, 2003 SuP. CT. REV. 27, 34 (noting that the Justices in the majority in Lawrence probably 
faced a dilemma because they thought the Texas statute had to be struck down but that any rationale 
for invalidation "would inevitably raise serious doubts about practices, including the ban on same­
sex marriages, that the majority did not want to question"). 
5 3. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 605 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 
38 1 U.S. 479, 527 ( 1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting)); see also Sunstein, supra note 52, at 31 (noting 
that Lawrence "was possible only because of the ludicrously poor fit between the sodomy prohibi­
tion and the society in which the Justices live"). 
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demic experts cited invited criticism from McCarthyites.54 Justice Jackson 
himself disparaged the NAACP's brief, which he said "starts and ends with 
sociology." 55 Judge George Bell Timmerman of South Carolina, alluding to 
footnote 1 1 , insisted that "[t]he judicial power of the United States . . .  does 
not extend to the enforcement of Marxist socialism as interpreted by Myr­
dal, the Swedish Socialist."5 6 Why Chief Justice Earl Warren chose to insert 
the controversial social science evidence into the footnote is unclear, 5 7 but 
the NAACP probably relied on it in the litigation partly because the conven­
tional sources of constitutional interpretation were so unsupportive of the 
challenge to school segregation.58 
Similarly in Lawrence, the majority opinion relies partly on an unortho­
dox source for interpreting the U.S. Constitution: a decision by the 
European Court of Human Rights.59 For the Justices to invoke a ruling from 
a foreign court as authority for their interpretation of the U.S. Constitution is 
virtually unprecedented. As Justice Scalia pointed out in his Lawrence dis­
sent, it is also highly controversial.60 Perhaps one can attribute such a 
reference to the effects of globalization; these days, the Justices spend more 
time in other countries and interact more with foreign judges. Alternatively, 
the invocation of a precedent from the European court may reflect the 
54. See Edmond Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 50, 157-68 ( 1955); Herbert 
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 ,  32-33 ( 1 959); 
Sanjay Mody, Note, Brown Footnote Eleven in Historical Context: Social Science and the Supreme 
Coun's Quest for Legitimacy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 793, 801--09 (2002). 
55. Tom C. Clark, Conference Notes, Brown v. Board of Education (on file with University 
of Texas, Tarlton Law Library, Clark Papers, Box A27). 
56. S.C. Negroes Ask to Transfer to State University, So. SCH. NEWS (Nashville), Feb. 1 958, 
at 7. 
57. For some interesting speculation, see Mody, supra note 54, at 8 1 4--28, suggesting that 
the Brown Court relied on social science evidence to help legitimize a ruling that departed from 
conventional approaches to constitutional interpretation. 
58. Cf RICHARD KLuGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 321 ( 1976) (noting that some NAACP lawyers 
ridiculed the social science evidence but that "Thurgood Marshall was taking all the help he could 
get"). 
59. Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003) (citing Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. (sec. A) ( 1 98 1 )  as refutation of "the premise in Bowers that the claim put forward was insub­
stantial in our Western civilization"); id. at 576 (noting subsequent decisions by the European Court 
of Human Rights adhering to Dudgeon). 
60. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (calling the majority's invocation of 
foreign precedents "[d]angerous dicta"); see also Lund & McGinnis, supra note 44, at 1580--8 1  
(criticizing the Court for looking to foreign legal decisions as support for an interpretation o f  the 
U.S. Constitution); Rosen, Immodest Proposal, supra note 41 ,  at 2 1  (noting that the invocation of a 
ruling by the European court in Lawrence confirms the fears of social conservatives who dread the 
internationalization of U.S. domestic Jaw). 
In the spring of 2004, dozens of congressional representatives sponsored a resolution in the 
House criticizing the Supreme Court for citing foreign legal authority in recent decisions, including 
Lawrence. The Reaffirmation of American Independence Resolution declared that "inappropriate 
judicial reliance on foreign judgments, Jaws, or pronouncements threatens the sovereignty of the 
United States, the separation of powers and the President's and the Senate's treaty-making author­
ity." H.R. Res. 568, 108th Cong. (2004). Rep. Tom Feeney, a Florida Republican who introduced the 
resolution, warned in an interview that judges who based their decisions on foreign precedents 
would risk the "ultimate remedy" of impeachment. Tom Curry, A Flap over Foreign Matter at the 
Supreme Coun, MSNBC.com, Mar. 1 1 ,  2004, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4506232/. 
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Justices' concern in Lawrence that the conventional sources of U.S. constitu­
tional law did not adequately support the result. 
II. COURT AS VANGUARD OR LAGGARD? 
Scholars and judges have long disagreed about the extent to which the 
Supreme Court acts as a countermajoritarian force in U.S. society. Justice 
Black once stated the conventional wisdom in particularly ringing terms: 
Courts stand "as havens of refuge for those who might otherwise suffer be­
cause they are helpless, weak, outnumbered, or because they are the non­
conforming victims of prejudice and public excitement."61 In his famous 
concurring opinion in Whitney v. California,62 Justice Louis Brandeis simi­
larly opined that one function of judicial review is to protect against "the 
occasional tyrannies of governing majorities."63 Like-minded scholars have 
written that without judicial review "there would be little hope for rights or 
for equality,"64 that courts "restrain the majority's worst excesses,"65 and that 
judicial review "advances the cause of peaceful change" by preventing the 
"[o]ppression of individuals and minorities" that might encourage resort to 
the right of revolution.66 
By contrast, other scholars have denied that the Court has either the in­
clination or the capacity to play this role of "countermajoritarian hero."67 In 
a classic article, the political scientist Robert Dahl observed that, given any 
reasonable set of assumptions about the nature of the political process, "it 
would appear to be somewhat naive to assume that the Supreme Court either 
would or could play the role of Galahad."68 Law professor Barry Friedman 
6 1 .  Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 ( 1940). 
62. 274 U.S. 357 ( 1927). 
63. Id. at 376 (Brandeis, J., concurring); see also United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 3 10, 
3 1 8  ( 1990); Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 902--03 ( 1 990) 
(O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment); Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 3 1 0  U.S. 586, 606 ( 1940) 
(Stone, J., dissenting). 
64. JUDITH A. BAER, EQUALITY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION: RECt.AJMING THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT 282 ( 1 983). 
65. Kenneth L. Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 GA. L. REv. 245, 287 ( 1983). 
66. Alpheus Thomas Mason, The Warren Court and the Bill of Rights, 56 YALE REV. 1 97, 
2 10 (1 967). 
67. See generally Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revo­
lutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1 ,  2 ( 1996) (citing examples of such scholarship). 
68. Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National 
Policy-Maker, 6 J. PuB. L. 279, 284 ( 1957). For additional scholarship denying that the Court is 
heroically countermajoritarian, see Robert G. McCloskey, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 224 
(1960) ("it is hard to find a single instance when the Court has stood firm for very long against a 
really clear wave of public demand"); David G. Barnum & John L. Sullivan, The Elusive Founda­
tions of Political Freedom in Britain and the United States, 52 J. POL. 7 19, 731-32 ( 1990); William 
Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, Public Opinion, the Attitudinal Model, and Supreme Court Deci­
sion Making: A Micro-Analytic Perspective, 58 J. Pot.. 169 ( 1996); Girardeau A. Spann, Pure 
Politics, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1 97 1 ,  1 973-74 ( 1990); Steven L. Winter, An Upside/Down View of the 
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 69 Tux. L. REv. 1 88 1 ,  1 890 ( 1991 ); and compare GERALD N. 
ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? ( 1 99 1 )  (arguing 
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likewise denies the existence of any significant counterrnajoritarian func­
tion, contending instead that judicial review should be seen as part of a 
"dialogue" between the judicial and legislative branches.69 Brown and Law­
rence shed light on how countennajoritarian the Court's rulings generally 
are. 
As we have seen, in 1954 the law-as understood by most of the Jus­
tices-was reasonably clear: segregation was constitutional. For the Justices 
to reject a result so clearly indicated by the conventional legal sources sug-
10 gests that they had very strong personal preferences to the contrary. And so 
they did. Although the Court had unanimously and casually endorsed public 
school segregation as recently as 1927,71 by the early 1950s, the views of 
most of the Justices reflected the dramatic popular changes in racial atti­
tudes and practices that had resulted from World War II. 72 The ideology of 
the war was antifascist and prodemocratic, and the contribution of African 
American soldiers was undeniable. Upon their return to the South, thou­
sands of black veterans tried to vote, many expressing the view of one such 
veteran that "after having been overseas fighting for democracy, I thought 
that when we got back here we should enjoy a little of it."73 Thousands more 
joined the NAACP, and many became civil rights litigants. Others helped 
launch a postwar social movement for racial justice. 
Other developments in the 1940s also fueled African American progress. 
Over the course of the decade, more than one and a half million southern 
blacks, pushed by changes in southern agriculture and pulled by wartime 
industrial demand, migrated to northern cities. This mass relocation-from a 
region in which blacks were almost universally disfranchised to one in 
which they could vote nearly without restriction-greatly enhanced their 
political power; indeed, they became a key swing constituency in the North. 
that courts cannot effectuate significant social change independently of broad extralegal forces and 
thus implicitly denying the existence of a substantial countermajoritarian problem); and Mark A. 
Graber, The Nonrnajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. PoL. 
DEV. 35 ( 1 993) (arguing that many landmark instances of judicial review, such as Dred Scott v. 
Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 ( 1857) and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 1 1 3  ( 1973), involve not countermajoritari­
anism, but rather legislative delegation to courts of difficult issues that threaten to disrupt existing 
political coalitions). 
69. Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REv. 577 ( 1 993); accord 
Barry Friedman, The Importance of Being Positive: The Nature and Function of Judicial Review, 72 
U. CIN. L. REV. 1 257, 1 259 (2004) [hereinafter Friedman, Importance of Being Positive] (arguing 
that the Supreme Court's role in judicial review is mainly "forcing a conversation within the polity 
about what the Constitution should mean"); see also Jack M. Balkin, What Brown Teaches Us About 
Constitutional Theory, 90 VA. L. REv. 1 537, 1551 -52 (2004) (noting that courts only protect minor­
ity groups that the majority wishes to see protected). 
70. For a similar example of this phenomenon, see Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). See 
generally Michael J. Klarman, Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of Constitutional History, 89 CAL. L. 
REV. 1 72 1  (2001)  (arguing that the result in Bush can only be understood as a reflection of the con­
servative Justices' personal preferences). 
71 .  Gong Lum v .  Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927). 
72. The following discussion is based on KLARMAN, supra note II, at 1 73-96 (citing rele­
vant sources). 
73. ROBERT J. NORRELL, REAPING THE WHIRLWIND: THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN 
TuSKEGEE 60-61 ( 1998). 
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Other blacks migrated from farms to cities within the South, facilitating the 
creation of a black middle class that had the inclination, capacity, and op­
portunity to engage in organized social protest. 
The onset of the Cold War in the late 1940s created another impetus for 
racial reform. In the ideological contest with communism, American democ­
racy was on trial, and southern white supremacy was its greatest 
vulnerability. The Justice Department's brief in Brown, which urged the 
Court to invalidate school segregation, emphasized that "[r]acial discrimina­
tion furnishes grist for the Communist propaganda mills."7 4 After Brown, 
supporters of the decision boasted that the United States' leadership of the 
free world "now rests on a firmer basis" and that American democracy had 
been "vindicat[ed] . . .  in the eyes of the world."7 5 
By the early 1950s such forces had produced concrete racial reforms. In 
1947, Jackie Robinson desegregated major league baseball. In 1948, Presi­
dent Truman issued executive orders desegregating the federal military and 
civil service. Dramatic changes in racial practices were occurring even in 
the South. Black voter registration there increased from three percent in 
1940 to twenty percent in 1952.7 6 Dozens of urban police forces in the 
South, including some in Mississippi, hired their first black officers. Minor 
league baseball teams, even in such places as Montgomery and Birming­
ham, Alabama, signed their first black players. Most southern states 
peacefully desegregated their graduate and professional schools under court 
order. Blacks began serving again on southern juries. In many southern 
states, the first blacks since Reconstruction were elected to urban political 
offices, and the walls of segregation were occasionally breached in public 
facilities and accommodations. 
As they deliberated over Brown, the Justices expressed astonishment at 
the extent of the recent changes. Sherman Minton detected "a different 
world today" with regard to race. 7 7  Frankfurter noted "the great changes in 
the relations between white and colored people since the first World War" 
and remarked that "the pace of progress has surprised even those most eager 
in its promotion."78 Jackson may have gone furthest, citing black advance­
ment as a constitutional justification for eliminating segregation. In his draft 
opinion he wrote that segregation "has outlived whatever justification it may 
have had . . . .  Negro progress under segregation has been spectacular and, 
tested by the pace of history, his rise is one of the swiftest and most dra-
74. Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae at 6, Brown v. Bd. of Educ. , 347 U.S. 483 
(1954), reprinted in 49 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 121 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975). 
75. Educators Comment on Schools Decision, Cm. DEFENDER, May 22, 1954, at 5. 
76. DAVID J. GARROW, PROTEST AT SELMA: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. AND THE VOTING 
RIGHTS ACT OF 1965, at 7 tbl. 1 - 1  (1978). 
77. Harold H. Burton, Conference Notes, School Segregation Cases (Dec. 12, 1953) (on file 
with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Burton Papers, Box 244). 
78. Memorandum from Felix Frankfurter, supra note 21. 
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matic advances in the annals of man."79 Blacks had thus overcome the pre­
sumptions on which segregation was based. 
It was these sorts of changes-political, social, demographic, and ideo­
logical-that made Brown possible. Frankfurter later conceded that he 
would have voted to uphold public school segregation in the 1940s because 
"public opinion had not then crystallized against it."so The Justices in Brown 
did not think that they were creating a movement for racial reform; they un­
derstood that they were working with, not against, historical forces. By the 
time the Court struck down school segregation, polls revealed that a narrow 
majority of Americans approved of the decision.s ' 
Lawrence, like Brown, came in the wake of extraordinary changes in at­
titudes and practices regarding homosexuality. s2 In 1986, Chief Justice 
Warren Burger in his concurring opinion in Bowers recited Blackstone's 
condemnation of homosexuality as an offense of "deeper malignity" than 
rape.s3 In the seventeen years between Bowers and Lawrence, public opinion 
went from opposing the legalization of homosexual relations by fifty-five 
percent to thirty-three percent to supporting legalization by sixty percent to 
thirty-five percent.84 Many states, either through legislative or judicial ac­
tion, nullified laws criminalizing same-sex sodomy.s 5 Several states and 
scores of cities added protection for sexual orientation to their antidiscrimi­
nation laws.s6 Nearly two hundred Fortune 500 companies extended job­
related benefits to gay partners,s 7 as did several states and scores of munici­
palities for their public employees.ss The Hawaii Supreme Court invalidated 
79. Jackson, supra note 29, at 1, 19-21 .  
80. Memorandum from William 0. Douglas (Jan. 25, 1960), reprinted in THE DOUGLAS 
LETTERS: SELECTIONS FROM THE PRIVATE PAPERS OF JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 1 69 (Melvin I. 
Urofsky ed., 1 987). 
8 1 .  GEORGE H. GALLUP, 2 THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1 935-197 1 ,  at 1 249-50 
(1972) (noting polls in the summer of 1954 showing fifty-four percent approving of Brown and 
forty-one percent disapproving); see also Balkin, supra note 69, at 1 538-39 (noting that one lesson 
of Brown is that the Court acts largely in accordance with national majorities). 
82. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 52, at 28-29 (noting that "[i]n the area of sexual orienta­
tion, America is in the midst of a civil rights revolution"). 
83. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 1 97 ( 1 986) (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
84. Gallup Poll, May 5-7, 2003, Public Opinion Online, The Roper Center, University of 
Connecticut, accession# 0429847, available at Westlaw, Public Opinion Online Database; see also 
Paul. R. Brewer, The Shifting Foundations of Public Opinion About Gay Rights, 65 J. PoL. 1 208, 
1 208--09 (2003) (noting a substantial reduction during the 1 990s in the percentage of Americans 
who regard same-sex relations as wrong). 
85. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAY LAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 
168 (1999). 
86. Id. at 130, 1 39, 233, app. B2; BARRY D. ADAM, THE RISE OF A GAY AND LESBIAN 
MOVEMENT 1 23 ( 1987). 
87. Thomas, supra note 2, at 45 (noting the number of Fortune 500 companies offering bene­
fits to gay partners rose from 1 in 1992 to 197 in 2003). 
88. John Cloud, The Battle over Gay Marriage, TIME, Feb. 1 6, 2004, at 56; Lisa Duggan, 
Holy Matrimony!, NATION, Mar. 15, 2004, at 14. 
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a ban on same-sex marriage, 89 and the Vermont Supreme Court ruled that 
same-sex couples must at least be permitted to form "civil unions."90 In the 
1990s, hundreds of openly gay men and women were elected to public of­
fices, and gays and lesbians entered mainstream culture on television, film, 
and music; in 1998, an openly gay man won a Pulitzer Prize for the first 
time.91 In 2003 the Episcopalian Church ordained its first openly gay 
b. h 92 IS Op. 
Both Brown and Lawrence reflected, at least as much as they produced, 
changes in social attitudes and practices. This is not to suggest that the 
Court is a perfect mirror of society. Indeed, the Justices share certain charac­
teristics that set them apart from average Americans: they are older, better­
educated, and more affluent.93 On some public policy disputes that become 
constitutional issues, these characteristics correlate with certain views. For 
example, better-educated, relatively affluent people are much more likely to 
favor abortion rights and to oppose school prayer than are average Ameri-
94 cans. 
Occasionally, the culturally elite values of the Justices make them more 
receptive than the general population to social reform. In 1954, opinion 
polls showed that nearly half of all Americans supported racial segregation 
in public schools, whereas college graduates condemned that practice by 
nearly three to one.9 5 Reflecting the values of the cultural elite, the Justices 
in Brown unanimously condemned public school segregation. 
Today, attitudes toward homosexuality strongly correlate with socioeco­
nomic status: better-educated, affluent people are generally much more 
supportive of gay rights than are average Americans. For example, one poll 
taken in 1999 found that seventy-four percent of respondents with post­
graduate education would vote for a well-qualified homosexual for president 
but only forty-six percent of high school dropouts would do so.96 Yet, on 
89. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). 
90. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). 
91. CRAIG A. RIMMERMAN, FROM IDENTITY TO POLITICS : THE LESBIAN AND GAY MOVE­
MENTS IN THE UNITED STATES I (2002). 
92. See Laurie Goodstein, Openly Gay Man Is Made a Bishop, N.Y. TIMES , Nov. 3, 2003, at 
A l .  
93. Michael J .  Klarman, What's So Great About Constitutionalism?, 93 Nw. U .  L .  REV. 145, 
189-91 (1998). 
94. Id. at 190 n.245. 
95. 2 GALLUP, supra note 81, at 1250. 
96. Gallup Poll, Feb. 19-21, 1999, Public Opinion Online, The Roper Center, University of 
Connecticut, accession# 0365291, available at Westlaw, Public Opinion Online Database; see also 
Press Release, George Gallup, The Gallup Poll, Little Change Found in Public's Acceptance of 
Homosexuality (Nov. 7, 1982) [hereinafter Gallup, Little Change] (on file with author) (noting that a 
poll conducted in June 1982 found that among those with a college education 44% thought that 
homosexuality was an acceptable lifestyle and 46% thought not, while among those with only a high 
school education the corresponding numbers were 32% and 52%, and among those with only a 
grade school education the numbers were 17% and 59% ); Press Release, George Gallup, Difficult 
Lot of Homosexual Seen in New Survey Findings (July 19, 1977) [hereinafter Gallup, Difficult Lot] 
(on file with the American Institute of Public Opinion) (noting a poll showing that among those with 
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gay-rights issues, another of the Justices' systemic biases has a partially off­
setting effect: attitudes toward homosexuality also strongly correlate with 
age: older people are generally much less tolerant than are younger people. 
For example, one recent opinion poll shows that respondents aged eighteen 
to twenty-nine favor legalization of "homosexual relations" by fifty-eight 
percent to thirty-nine percent, while those aged sixty-five and over oppose 
legalization by sixty-one percent to twenty-four percent.9 7  On gay rights, 
then, one might have predicted that the Court would be less far in advance 
of public opinion than it had been on race. This, in fact, has almost surely 
been the case. The Justices' age bias may help explain why Bowers v. 
Hardwick was decided as it was and why the Court took so long to overrule 
it. 
The main point, though, is that neither Brown nor Lawrence created a 
new movement for social reform; both decisions supported movements that 
had already acquired significant momentum by the time their grievances had 
reached the Supreme Court. To be sure, Brown occurred earlier in the course 
of the civil rights movement than Lawrence did in the course of the gay­
rights movement.98 Opinion polls showed only a slender national majority 
supporting Brown in 1954, whereas by 2003 it was hard to find anyone sup­
porting criminal prosecution for private, consensual, adult same-sex 
relations.99 But neither ruling was at the vanguard of a social reform move­
ment, as was the California Supreme Court decision in 1948 striking down a 
ban on interracial marriage100 or the Massachusetts Supreme Court decision 
in 2003 striking down a ban on same-sex marriage.w1 The U.S. Supreme 
Court rarely, if ever, plays such an adventurous role. w2 
a college background 57% thought that homosexual relations should be legal and 35% that they 
should not, while among those with a high school education the corresponding numbers were 42% 
and 44%, and among those with only a grade school education the numbers were 21 % and 57% ). 
97. Katharine Q. Seelye & Janet Elder, Strong Support ls Found for Ban on Gay Marriage, 
N.Y. TIMES , Dec. 21, 2003, at Al ; see also NAT'L Pus. RADIO, GAY MARRIAGE AND CIVIL UNIONS 
(2003) (noting that people aged eighteen to twenty-nine oppose gay marriage by 45% to 39%, 
whereas people aged sixty-four and over oppose it  by 75% to 18%); Public Opinion Online, supra 
note 96 (reporting an opinion poll finding that 65% of people under aged twenty-nine would vote 
for a qualified homosexual for president but only 39% of people aged seventy and older would do 
so) ; Gallup, Little Change, supra note 96 (noting that a poll conducted in June 1982 found that 
among those aged 18 to 29, 40% thought homosexuality was an acceptable lifestyle and 46% did 
not, while among those aged 30 to 49 the corresponding numbers were 37% and 50%, and among 
those aged 50 and older the numbers were 25% and 57%); Gallup, Difficult Lot, supra note 96 
(reporting a poll taken in 1977 that showed that among those aged 30 and under, 57% thought that 
homosexual relations should be legal and 34% thought they should not, while among those aged 30 
to 49 the corresponding numbers were 47% and 41 %,  and among those 50 and over the numbers 
were 29% and 53%). 
98. Balkin, supra note 69, at 1542 & n.24. 
99. See infra notes 340-345 and accompanying text. 
JOO. Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948). 
I O I .  Goodridge v. Dep' t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
102. See Balkin, supra note 69, at 1546 (observing that the Supreme Court is better at "piling 
on" than at "tackling"); Friedman, Importance of Being Positive, supra note 69, at 1279 (concluding 
that "the Court operates on a leash," which prevents it from deviating far from public opinion). 
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III. JUDICIAL STRATEGIZI NG-EVADING THE MARRIAGE ISSUE 
Scholars have written a good deal about the strategic element of judicial 
decisionmak:ing-that is, the extent to which judges decide cases not simply 
on the basis of good-faith interpretations of the relevant legal sources but 
also on calculations regarding the political feasibility of implementing vari­
ous rulings. Political scientists especially have described many such 
instances of judicial strategizing. 103 Legal scholars have been more inclined 
to debate the normative defensibility of such politically informed decision­
mak:ing.104 Both Brown and Lawrence illustrate this strategic aspect of 
judicial decisionmak:ing. 
Both opinions were consciously written narrowly to avoid resolving the 
whole range of issues regarding classifications based on race and sexual 
orientation. Brown was decided as an education case. The Court emphasized 
that "education is perhaps the most important function of state and local 
governments" ws and held only that "(s]eparate educational facilities are in­
herently unequal."106 The Justices deliberately refrained from announcing a 
presumptive ban on all racial classifications. One principal reason they did 
so was to avoid calling into question the constitutionality of state laws bar­
ring interracial marriage. 107 
Many southern whites had charged that the real goal of the NAACP's 
school desegregation campaign was "to open the bedroom doors of our 
white women to the Negro men"108 and "to mongrelize the white race."109 For 
103. For scholarship emphasizing the strategic aspects of judicial decisionmaking, see WAL-
TER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 171-75, 186--97, 204-10 (1964); Lee Epstein & 
Thomas G. Walker, The Role of the Supreme Court in American Society: Playing the Reconstruction 
Game, in CONTEMPLATING COURTS 315 (Lee Epstein ed . ,  1995); Mark A. Graber, Federalist or 
Friends of Adams: The Marshall Court and Party Politics, 12 STUD. AM. PoL . DEV. 229 (1998); 
Mark A. Graber, The Passive-Aggressive Virtues: Cohens v. Virginia and the Problematic Estab­
lishment of Judicial Power, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 67 (1995); Michael J. Klarman, How Great Were 
the "Great" Marshall Court Decisions?, 87 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1157--64 (2001); Klarman, supro 
note 70, at 1757--60; Jack Knight & Lee Epstein, On the Struggle for Judicial Supremacy, 30 L. & 
Soc'y REv. 87 (1996); and Forrest Maltzman et al., Strotegy and Judicial Choice: New Institutional­
ist Approaches to Supreme Court Decision-Making, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING, supra 
note 7, at 43--63. 
104. Compare ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 174 (1962) (defending 
strategizing in some circumstances), with PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART & WECHSLER's THE FED­
ERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 660--62 (2d ed . 1973) (criticizing such strategizing), and 
Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues "A Comment on Principle and Expediency 
in Judicial Review, 64 CoLUM. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (1964) (same); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE 
CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999). 
105. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (emphasis added) .  
106. Id. at 495 (emphasis added). 
107. Michael J. Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. 
REV. 213, 241-43 (1991). 
108. A labama: Marengo Meeting, So. ScH. NEWS (Nashville), Jan. 6, 1955, at 2. 
109. Attacks NAACP, So. ScH. NEWS (Nashville), Nov. 1955, at 9 (quoting state senator Sam 
Engelhardt of Macon County, Ala.) .  For additional statements to s imilar effect, see TOM B RADY, 
BLACK MONDAY 64--67 (1954); HERMAN E. TALMADGE, You AND SEGREGATION 42-44 (1955); and 
Walter B. Jones, I Speak for the White Race, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, Mar. 4, 1957, microformed 
on Papers of the NAACP, pt. 20, reel 4, frame 436 (Univ. Publ'ns of Am.). 
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the Justices to strike down antimiscegenation laws so soon after Brown 
might have appeared to validate such suspicions. Moreover, opinion polls in 
the 1950s revealed that over ninety percent of whites--even outside of the 
South--opposed interracial marriage. 1 10 During oral argument in one of the 
original school segregation cases, Justice Frankfurter had seemed relieved 
when counsel denied that barring school segregation would necessarily in­
validate antimiscegenation laws.1 1 1  Frankfurter later explained that one 
reason that Brown was written as it was--emphasizing the importance of 
public education rather than condemning all racial classifications-was to 
avoid the miscegenation issue.1 1 2  
However, the Justices were quickly confronted with cases that seemed to 
require them to acknowledge that Brown's logic extended beyond the sphere 
of education. In 1955-1956 the Court faced challenges to state-mandated 
segregation of public beaches, golf courses, and local transportation. Be­
cause Brown had emphasized the importance of public education rather than 
questioning the validity of all racial classifications, invalidating segregation 
in these post-Brown cases seemed to require additional explanation. Yet the 
Justices provided none, instead issuing cursory per curiam opinions that 
merely cited Brown. 1 13 Those legal academics most committed to "reasoned 
elaboration" in j udicial decisionmaking were virtually apoplectic. 1 1 4 
Yet even these post-Brown per curiams stopped short of invalidating an­
timiscegenation laws. The Justices had an opportunity to determine the 
constitutionality of such laws, but they refused to take it, even though avoid­
ing it required them to act disingenuously. The case was Nairn v. Naim. 1 15 
There, a Chinese man and a white woman had tried to circumvent Virginia's 
ban on interracial marriage by wedding in North Carolina. After returning to 
Virginia, the woman later sought an annulment under the antimiscegenation 
law, which her husband then challenged as unconstitutional. The trial court 
granted the annulment, and the Virginia Court of Appeals affirmed, sustain­
ing the statute. 
This was the last case the Justices wished to see on their docket in 1955, 
but it seemed to fall within the Court's mandatory j urisdiction. Today, the 
Justices have almost complete discretion over their docket, but in the mid-
1950s federal law still required them to grant appeals when state courts had 
1 10. 2 GALLUP , supra note 81, at 1572. 
1 1 1. Transcript of Oral Argument at 10-11, Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 ( 1954) (No. 413), 
reprinted in 49 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 74, at 405-
06. Justice Frankfurter asked counsel whether striking down school segregation would necessarily 
lead the Court to invalidate antimiscegenation laws and then praised the answer that such legislation 
would be suspect but not necessarily prohibited. Id. 
1 1 2. GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 664-70 (1994). 
113. E.g., Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 
(1955); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955). 
1 14. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS 
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1 64-70 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey 
eds ., 1994); Wechsler, supra note 54, at 11-12, 15-17. 
115 .  Nairn v. Nairn, 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1955), vacated, 350 U.S. 89 1 (1955). 
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rejected federal claims that were not "insubstantial."116 To say that antimis­
cegenation laws posed an insubstantial constitutional question would have 
been absurd. The importance was "obvious," law clerk William A. Norris 
(later a judge on the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit) told Justice 
Douglas, and "[f]ailure to decide the case would blur any distinction re­
maining between certiorari and appeal."11 7 Justice Harold Burton's clerk 
agreed that the Court could not honestly avoid the case, though he would 
have preferred to "give the present fire a chance to bum down."118 
Both clerks underestimated the desperation and creativity of the Justices. 
Though several Justices wished to take jurisdiction, 119 others searched for an 
escape route. Justice Tom Clark suggested one: the plaintiff should be es­
topped from invoking the antimiscegenation law because she knew of the 
defendant's race when they married and deliberately evaded the statutory 
prohibition.120 Burton suggested another: they could dismiss the case on the 
independent state-law ground that Virginia required residents to marry 
within the state-a plainly erroneous reading of Virginia law.121 
Of all the Justices, Frankfurter felt the gravest anxiety about the case. If 
this had been a certiorari petition, he would have rejected it, as "due consid­
eration of important public consequences is relevant to the exercise of 
discretion in passing on such petitions."122 (Indeed, in 1 954 the Court had 
denied certiorari in another southern miscegenation case.123) But Nairn was 
an appeal, and Frankfurter admitted that the challenge to antimiscegenation 
laws "cannot be rejected as frivolous."124 Still, the "moral considerations" for 
dismissing the appeal "far outweigh the technical considerations in noting 
jurisdiction."125 To thrust the miscegenation issue into "the vortex of the pre­
sent disquietude" would risk "thwarting or seriously handicapping the 
1 1 6. 28 u.s.c. § 1 257 ( 1 952). 
1 17.  Memorandum from WAN (William A. Norris, Law Clerk) to William 0. Douglas, Assoc. 
Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Certiorari in Nairn v. Nairn (Oct. 24, 1 955) (on file with Library of 
Congress, Manuscript Division, Douglas Papers, Office Memos, nos. 350-99, Box 1 164); see also 
Gregory Michael Dorr, Principled Expediency: Eugenics, Nairn v. Nairn, and the Supreme Court, 42 
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1 19, 1 49-50 (1998) (noting other similar statements). 
1 1 8. Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the Supreme 
Court, 1948-1958, 68 GEO. L.J. 1 ,  63 ( 1979) (quoting Memorandum of AJM, Law Clerk, to Harold 
H. Burton, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Certiorari in Nairn v. Nairn (Oct. 1 955)). 
1 19. Dorr, supra note 1 17, at 153-54; Hutchinson, supra note 1 1 8, at 64. 
1 20. Tom C. Clark, handwritten note to Robert H. Jackson, Nairn v. Nairn (on file with the 
University of Texas, Tarlton Law Library, Clark Papers, Box A47). 
1 2 1 .  Memorandum from WAN (William A. Norris, Law Clerk) to William 0. Douglas, Assoc. 
Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Supplemental memorandum regarding Nairn v. Nairn (undated) (on 
file with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Douglas Papers, Office Memos, nos. 350-99, 
Box 1 1 64). 
1 22. Felix Frankfurter, Memorandum, Nairn v. Nairn (microformed on Frankfurter Papers, pt. 
2, reel 1 7, frames 588-90 (Univ. Publ'ns of Am. 1986)). 
1 23 .  Jackson v. Alabama, 7 2  So. 2 d  1 16 (Ala. 1 954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 888 ( 1954). 
1 24. Felix Frankfurter, Memorandum, supra note 122. 
1 25. id. 
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enforcement of [Brown]."126 Frankfurter's proposed solution, which the Jus­
tices adopted, was to remand the case to the Virginia court of appeals with 
instructions to return it to the trial court for further proceedings in order to 
clarify the parties' relationship to the commonwealth, which was said to be 
uncertain from the record; clarification might obviate the need to resolve the 
constitutional question. 127 On remand, the Virginia jurists refused to comply 
with the Court's instructions; they denied that the record was unclear and 
that state law permitted returning final decisions to trial courts in order to 
gather additional evidence. 128 Virginia newspapers treated the state court's 
response as an instance of nullification. 129 
The petitioner then filed a motion to recall the Court's mandate and to 
set the case for argument. Douglas 's law clerk, Norris, now identified three 
options that were available. The Court could summarily vacate the state 
judgment to "punish" Virginia for its disobedience. 130 Norris thought that 
this solution would be "intemperate and would unnecessarily increase the 
friction between this Court and the southern state courts." Second, the Jus­
tices could circumvent the recalcitrant state high court and remand the case 
directly to the trial court. Finally, they could take the appeal, which would 
be a "tacit admission that the Court's original remand was unnecessary."131 
Norris favored the last option and warned that "[i]t will begin to look obvi­
ous if the case is not taken that the Court is trying to run away from its 
obligation to decide the case."132 
Norris failed even to imagine the option chosen by a majority­
dismissing the appeal on the ground that the Virginia court's response 
"leaves the case devoid of a properly presented federal question."133 A ma­
jority of the Justices apparently preferred being humiliated at the hands of 
truculent state jurists to further stoking the fires of racial controversy ignited 
by Brown. Once again, those academic commentators most committed to 
"reasoned elaboration" in judicial decisionmaking scored the Court for tak­
ing action that was "wholly without basis in the law."1 34 Not until the 1960s 
1 26. Id. 
1 27.  Nairn v.  Nairn, 350 U.S. 89 1 ( 1955); Hutchinson, supra note 1 18, at 64-66. 
128.  Nairn v. Nairn, 90 S.E.2d 849 (Va. 1 956). 
1 29. See Dorr, supra note 1 1 7, at 156. 
1 30. Memorandum from WAN (William A. Norris, Law Clerk) to William 0. Douglas, Assoc. 
Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Certiorari in Nairn v. Nairn (Mar. I ,  1 956) (on file with Douglas Pa­
pers, Office Memos, nos. 350-99, Box 1 164). 
1 3 1 .  Id. 
1 32. Id. 
133.  Nairn v. Nairn, 350 U.S. 985 (1956); see also Handwritten Note from Felix Frankfurter, 
Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Tom. C. Clark, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (un­
dated) (on file with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Clark Papers, Box A47) (noting that 
Frankfurter's proposed disposition of the case, which is what the Court ultimately adopted, "fills me 
with hope, confident hope, that my anxiety will soon be lifted"). 
1 34. Wechsler, supra note 54, at 34; see also supra note 1 14 and accompanying text. 
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would the Court announce a presumptive ban on racial classifications, 135 and 
not until 1967 would it strike down antimiscegenation laws.13 6 
* * * * * 
In Lawrence, the Justices likewise strained to avoid resolving the same­
sex marriage issue.13 7 Justice Kennedy's majority opinion emphasized that 
the case involved "the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in 
the most private of places, the home."138 He also carefully noted that the case 
did not "involve whether the government must give formal recognition to 
any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter."139 Justice 
O'Connor's concurring opinion similarly stressed that just because "this law 
as applied to private, consensual conduct is unconstitutional under the Equal 
Protection Clause does not mean that other laws distinguishing between 
heterosexuals and homosexuals would similarly fail under rational basis 
review."14° Further, she noted that in its effort to defend its ban on same-sex 
sodomy, Texas had failed to assert a legitimate interest, "such as national 
security or preserving the traditional institution of marriage."141 O'Connor 
even went so far as to stipulate, without explication, that "other reasons exist 
to promote the institution of marriage beyond mere moral disapproval of an 
excluded group."142 She could hardly have been clearer in signaling her un­
willingness to commit to invalidating bans on openly gay military service 
and same-sex marriage. 
That Kennedy and O'Connor would go to such lengths to deny that 
Lawrence has implications for same-sex marriage is not surprising. Just as at 
the time of Brown a majority of Americans opposed public school segrega­
tion but overwhelmingly supported antimiscegenation laws, so at the time of 
Lawrence public opinion opposed criminal prosecution of private gay sex 
but supported by a two-to-one margin laws restricting marriage to unions 
between men and women.143 
Justice O'Connor's constitutional jurisprudence-and, perhaps to a 
somewhat lesser extent, Justice Kennedy's-reveals a strong sensitivity fo 
public opinion.1 44  On the question of whether it was constitutional to execute 
135. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 1 84, 1 92-93, 196 (1964); id. at 197 (Harlan, J., concur­
ring). 
136. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 ( 1967). 
1 37. See Karlan, supra note 44, at 1459-60 (noting that the majority in Lawrence may have 
feared that invalidating the Texas law under the Equal Protection Clause would have required it to 
strike down all laws treating gays and straights differently, including marriage laws). 
138. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003). 
139. Id. at 578. 
140. Id. at 585 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
1 4 1 .  Id. 
142. Id. 
143. See infra notes 340--345 and accompanying text. 
144. See, e.g., Friedman, Importance of Being Positive, supra note 69, at 1 302. 
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the mentally retarded, O'Connor and Kennedy were apparently more influ­
enced than other Justices by the number of states that had recently forbidden 
the practice. 14 5 They seem more comfortable than the other conservative Jus­
tices in using the Constitution to suppress outliers but less comfortable than 
some of the liberals in using the Constitution to resist majority opinion. 
Likewise, on abortion and affirmative action, O'Connor's apparent shifts 
over time toward a more liberal position can be plausibly attributed to 
changes in public opinion.1 4 6 No Court on which O'Connor is the median 
Justice will invalidate bans on same-sex marriage any time soon. 
Yet just as Brown led inexorably, albeit gradually, to a presumptive judi­
cial ban on all racial classifications, so is La.wrence likely to lead eventually 
to a wesumptive judicial ban on all classifications based on sexual orienta­
tion. 47 Whereas Kennedy and O'Connor insist that Lawrence has no 
necessary implications for same-sex marriage, Justice Scalia's dissent 
rightly observes that they offer no basis-other than what he calls a "bald, 
unreasoned disclaimer"-for distinguishing that issue.1 48 Lawrence denies 
that "moral disapproval" of homosexuality is a legitimate state interest. It is 
difficult, however, to identify a state interest other than moral disapproval 
that would convincingly justify banning same-sex marriage.1 49 The subse­
quent decision by the Massachusetts Supreme Court invalidating such bans 
confirms the difficulty of identifying plausible state interests other than 
moral disapproval that would justify treating gays and straights differently.1 50 
145. Compare Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 3 10, 3 14-15 (2002) (majority opinion joined 
by O'Connor, J. and Kennedy, J.) (holding unconstitutional the execution of the mentally retarded, 
partly on the basis of "the dramatic shift in the state legislative landscape that has occurred in the . . . 
13 years [since Penry]") with Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 ( 1989) (O'Connor, J.,  joined by 
Kennedy, J.) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to the execution of the mentally retarded partly 
because "there is insufficient evidence of . . .  a consensus today" against the practice). 
146. On abortion, compare Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion), with Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 452 U.S. 450 
(1989). On affirmative action, compare Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), which apparently 
upheld affirmative action in law school admissions partly because the practice was endorsed by 
leading societal institutions such as the military and Fortune 500 companies, with Adarand Con­
structors, Inc. v. Pena, 5 1 5  U.S. 200 ( 1995); Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602 
(1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. , 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (plural­
ity opinion); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 196 ( 1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); and 
"Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267 ( 1986), all of which invalidated affirmative 
plans or at least subjected them to rigorous scrutiny. 
147. Robert P. George & David L. Tubbs, Why We Need a Marriage Amendment, CITY J., 
Autumn 2004, at 48 (noting that the Court may be reluctant to impose same-sex marriage now but 
that eventually it "is almost certain to nationalize the issue and make same-sex-marriage legal from 
coast to coast"). 
148. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 604 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. at 601 
(noting that Justice O'Connor's Equal Protection rationale "leaves on pretty shaky grounds state 
laws limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples"). 
149. See Sunstein, supra note 52, at 72. 
1 50. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). The court in Good­
ridge rejected three interests proffered by the state to justify denying marriage to same-sex couples: 
(!) creating a favorable setting for procreation; (2) ensuring that childrearing take place in "optimal" 
settings; (3) saving state resources by limiting the scope of the marriage "subsidy." 
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Scalia is surely right as a doctrinal matter but just as surely wrong as a 
practical matter (as he undoubtedly appreciates). Five members of this Court 
are not about to strike down any time soon bans on same-sex marriage-not 
when public opinion strongly supports such laws.151 Figuring out how the 
Court in such a case would distinguish Lawrence is an interesting ques­
tion.152 Perhaps the Court would simply refuse to take such a case, much as 
the Justices after Brown managed to evade the antimiscegenation issue in 
Naim. 153 Alternatively, the Justices might adopt the unorthodox strategy pur­
sued by Justice Kennedy in Romer v. Evans154 and pretend that Lawrence 
never happened, much as Romer fails even to acknowledge the existence of 
Bowers. Regardless of whether they choose to ignore or to distinguish Law­
rence, Justices Kennedy and O'Connor are not about to create a 
constitutional right for gays to marry in light of contemporary public opin­
ion. 
Yet the Court's refusal after Brown to extend its antidiscrimination ra­
tionale to the logical conclusion of invalidating antimiscegenation laws 
lasted only as long as public opinion remained overwhelmingly hostile to 
interracial marriage. The same is likely to be true of same-sex marriage. If 
public opinion on that issue becomes more tolerant-as I suggest below is 
almost certain to happen1 55-then the Court is likely to extend Lawrence's 
condemnation of "moral disapproval" of homosexuality and invalidate bans 
on same-sex marriage.1 56 The critical development in both arenas will have 
been changes in public opinion, not the inexorable doctrinal logic of the 
earlier decision. 
IV. CONSEQUENCES 
Scholars have long disagreed about how consequential Supreme Court 
rulings tend to be.157 Some have argued that such decisions make little if any 
1 5 1 .  See, e.g., Jonathan Rauch, The Supreme Court Ruled for Privacy-Not for Gay Mar­
riage, 35 NAT'L J. 2402, 2402-03 (JULY 26, 2003) (noting that this conservative Supreme Court is 
not going to "ram same-sex marriage down the throat of an unwilling public"). 
1 52. See Sunstein, supra note 52, at 72 (speculating that the Court would distinguish same­
sex marriage from Lawrence on the ground that public opinion still strongly supports the traditional 
definition of marriage). 
1 53. Cf Lofton v. Sec'y of Fla. Dep't of Children and Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (I I th Cir. 
2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 869 (2005); Charles Lane, Gay-Adoption Ban in Florida to Stand, 
WASH. PoST, Jan. 1 1 , 2005, at A4 (noting the Court's refusal to hear a challenge to Florida's unique 
statute banning adoptions by gays and suggesting that this action "may signal the Court's reluctance 
to move into a potentially charged area"). 
1 54. 5 1 7 U.S. 620 (1996). 
1 55. See infra notes 381-392 and accompanying text. 
1 56. Cf Sunstein, supra note 52, at 31 ('The Supreme Court may or may not read Lawrence 
to require states to recognize gay and lesbian marriages. But if and when it does so, i t  will be fol­
lowing public opinion, not leading it."). 
1 57. For scholarship, much of it by political scientists, examining the impact of Supreme 
Court decisions, see, for example, KENNETH M. DOLBEARE & PHILLIP E. HAMMOND, THE SCHOOL 
PRAYER DECISIONS: FROM COURT POLICY TO LOCAL PRACTICE 133-53 (197 1) ;  JOEL F. HANDLER, 
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A THEORY OF LAW REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE 
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difference, while others have claimed that they can be of enormous impor­
tance. In the race context, for example, we hear at one end of the spectrum 
that Brown v. Board of Education created the civil rights movement and, at 
the other, that it had no impact whatsoever.158 Examining the consequences 
of Brown and Lawrence illustrates the unpredictable, and occasionally per­
verse, consequences of Supreme Court rulings. 159 
A. Brown 's Backlash 
Brown produced very little school desegregation in the South for nearly 
a decade, as white southerners launched a campaign of massive resistance 
that proved largely successful.160 But Brown had other, less direct conse­
quences. The Court's ruling dramatically raised the salience of the segregation 
issue, forcing many people to take a position for the first time. 161 Brown was 
also enormously symbolic to African Americans, many of whom regarded it 
as the greatest victory for their race since the Emancipation Proclamation.162 
In addition, Brown inspired southern blacks to file petitions and lawsuits 
challenging school segregation, including in dozens of localities in the Deep 
1 92-209 (1978); LEVERAGING THE LAW: USING THE COURTS TO ACHIEVE SOCIAL CHANGE (David 
A. Schultz ed,, 1998); ROSENBERG, supra note 68; SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 8, at 333-55; 
STEPHEN L. WASBY, THE IMPACT OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: SOME PERSPECTIVES 
( 1970); Michael W. McCann, Refonn Litigation on Trial, 17 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 7 1 5  ( 1992); 
Peter H. Schuck, Public Law Litigation and Social Refonn, 102 YALE L.J. 1 763 (1993). 
1 58. On the importance of Brown specifically, compare ROSENBERG, supra note 68, at 7 1 ,  
169, 338, and Gerald N. Rosenberg, Brown is Dead! Long Live Brown!: The Endless Attempt to 
Canonize a Case, 80 VA. L. REv. 1 61 ,  1 7 1  (1994), which deny that Brown had any significant posi­
tive impact on the movement for racial equality, with JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE 
COURTS: How A DEDICATED BAND OF LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 1 2, 
1 1 6 (1994), and Owen Fiss, A Life Lived Twice, 100 YALE L.J. 1 1 17, 1 1 1 8 ( 1991 ), which argue that 
Brown was instrumental to the modem civil rights movement. For other extravagant assessments of 
Brown's importance, see DAVISON M. DOUGLAS, READING, WRITING & RACE: THE DESEGREGATION 
OF THE CHARLOTTE SCHOOLS 25 ( 1995); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE WARREN COURT AND THE 
PuRSUIT OF JUSTICE 15 ( 1 998); J. HARVIE WILKINSON, FROM Brown TO Bakke: THE SUPREME 
COURT AND SCHOOL INTEGRATION: 1954-1978, at 6 (1979); Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a 
Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 6 1 ,  62 ( 1988); and Paul Finkelman, Civil Rights in Histori­
cal Context: In Defense of Brown, 1 1 8 HARV. L. REV. 973, 973-74, 976, 1006-07, 1017, 1029 
(2005). For a more measured assessment, see Mark Tushnet, Some Legacies of Brown v. Board of 
Education, 90 VA. L. REV. 1 693, 1 708-12 (2004), which agrees with Rosenberg that the contribu­
tion of Brown to the transformation of U.S. race relations "is easily exaggerated" but nonetheless 
concludes that the Supreme Court might have played an important role in articulating the principles 
of New Deal liberalism. For my own views on this subject, see KLARMAN, supra note 1 1 ,  ch. 7. 
1 59. On the idea of backlash generally, see Charles H. Franklin & Liane C. Kosaki, Republican 
Schoolmaster: The U.S. Supreme Court, Public Opinion, and Abortion, 83 AM. PoL. Sc1. REV. 75 1 
( 1 989); Friedman, Importance of Being Positive, supra note 69, at 1 291-93; and Michael J. Klar­
man, How Brown Changed Race Relations: The Backlash Thesis, J. AM. HlsT., June 1 994, at 8 1 .  
160. O n  massive resistance, see generally NUMAN v. BARTLEY, THE RISE O F  MASSIVE RESIS­
TANCE: RACE AND POLITICS IN THE SOUTH DURING THE 1950's (1969), and NEIL R. MCMILLEN, 
THE CITIZENS' COUNCIL: ORGANIZED RESISTANCE TO THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION, 1954-62 
( 197 1  ). On the lack of desegregation in the first decade, see KLARMAN, supra note 1 1 ,  at 344-63. 
1 6 1 .  KLARMAN, supra note 1 1 ,  at 364-65. 
1 62. Id. at 369. 
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South, where such challenges would otherwise have been inconceivable in 
the mid- 1 950s. 163 
Yet Brown may have mattered even more in another way. By the early 
1 960s, a powerful direct-action protest movement had exploded in the 
South, featuring sit-ins, freedom rides, and street demonstrations. Brown 
helped to ensure that when such demonstrations came, politicians such as 
Bull Connor and George Wallace were there to meet them with violence. 
That brutality, when vividly communicated to national audiences by televi­
sion, mobilized public opinion in support of transformative civil rights 
legislation. 164 
In the short term, Brown retarded progressive racial reform in the South. 
With school desegregation lurking in the background, whites in the Deep 
South suddenly could no longer tolerate black voting. Significant postwar 
expansions of black suffrap in Mississippi, Alabama, and Louisiana were 
halted and then reversed. 16 Brown also retarded the pace of university de­
segregation, which had been proceeding slowly but surely under the Court's 
1 950 ruling in Sweatt v.  Painter. 166 The post-Brown backlash in the South 
also reversed progress in desegregating sporting competitions, including 
minor league baseball and intercollegiate football and basketball. 167 Even 
minor interracial courtesies and interactions that were uncontroversial be­
fore 1 954 often had to be suspended in the post-Brown racial hysteria. In 
1959 Governor John Patterson of Alabama barred black marching bands 
from the inaugural parade, where they had previously been warmly re­
ceived. 168 Since its founding in 1 942, Koinonia Farm, an interracial religious 
cooperative in Americus, Georgia, had experienced little harassment, but 
after Brown its products were boycotted and its roadside produce stands 
were shot at. Interracial unions that had thrived in the South for years self­
destructed after Brown.169 
Most importantly, in the wake of Brown, political contests in southern 
states assumed a common pattern: Candidates maneuvered against one an­
other to occupy the most extreme point on the segregationist spectrum. 
Racial moderates, who denounced diehard resistance to Brown, were labeled 
"double crossers," "sugar-coated integrationists," "cowards," and "trai­
tors." 110 Most moderates either joined the segregationist bandwagon, or they 
were retired from service. A Virginia politician observed that it "would be 
163. Id. at 368-69. 
1 64. For a more detailed exegesis of this backlash argument, see id. at 385-442. 
165. Id. at 392-93. 
166. 339 U.S. 629 (1950); see KLARMAN, supra note 1 1 , at 393. 
167. KLARMAN, supra note 1 1 , at 393-94. 
168. Patterson Inaugurated with Pledge to Continue Separation of State Schools, So. ScH. 
NEWS (Nashville), Feb. 1959, at 16. 
169. Margaret Price, Draft of Joint Interagency Fact Finding Project on Violence and Intimi­
dation 5 1-52, microformed on Papers of the NAACP, pt. 20, reel 1 1 , frames 388-89 (Univ. Publ'ns 
of Am.). 
170. KLARMAN, supra note 1 1 ,  at 391 (citations omitted). 
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suicide to run on any other platform [than segregation] ."111 A liberal southern 
editor explained that "it takes guts NOT to come out for segregation every 
d ,, 112 ay. 
Although most southern politicians avoided explicit exhortations to vio­
lence, the extremist rhetoric they used probably encouraged it. Marvin 
Griffin, the Democratic nominee for governor of Georgia, condemned vio­
lence but also insisted that "no true Southerner feels morally obliged to 
recognize the legality of this act of tyranny [Brown] ."113 Senator James East­
land of Mississippi cautioned that "[a]cts of violence and lawlessness have 
no place," but only after he had incited his audience with reminders that 
"[t]here is no law that a free people must submit to a flagrant invasion of 
their personal liberty" and that "[n]o people in all the history of Government 
have been forced to integrate against their will."174 Congressman James 
Davis of Georgia insisted that "[t]here is no place for violence or lawless 
acts,"m but only after he had called Brown "a monumental fraud which is 
shocking, outrageous and reprehensible," warned against "meekly ac­
cept[ing] this brazen usurpation of power," and denied any obligation on 
"the people to bow the neck to this new form of tyranny."176 These politi­
cians either knew that such rhetoric was likely to incite violence, or they 
were criminally negligent for not knowing it. 
The linkage between particular public officials who benefited from the 
post-Brown political backlash and the brutality that inspired civil rights leg­
islation is compelling. T. Eugene ("Bull") Connor had been on the 
Birmingham City Commission since 1 937. But in the early 1 950s, civic 
leaders, who had come to regard him as an embarrassment because of his 
extremism and frequent brutality toward blacks, orchestrated his public hu­
miliation through an illicit sexual encounter. Connor retired from public life 
in 1 953, and racial progress ensued in Birmingham, including the estab­
lishment of the first hospital for blacks, the desegregation of elevators in 
downtown office buildings, and serious efforts to desegregate the police 
force.177 
After Brown, Birmingham's racial progress ground to a halt, and Connor 
resurrected his political career. In 1957 he regained his city commission 
seat, defeating an incumbent he attacked as weak on segregation. In the late 
17 I .  Virginia's Pupil Placement Act Is Under Challenge in Two Courts, So. ScH. NEWS 
(Nashville), July 1957, at 3. 
172. Stan Opotowsky, Dixie Dynamite: The Inside Story of the White Citizens' Councils 18 
(Jan. 1957), microformed on Papers of the NAACP, pt. 20, reel 13, frames 670, 685 (Univ. Publ'ns 
of Am.). 
173. Georgia, So. ScH. NEWS (Nashville), Nov. 4, 1954, at 10. 
174. Sen. James Eastland, The South Will Fight!, ARK. FAITH, Dec. 1955, at 8-9, microformed 
on Papers of the NAACP, pt. 20, reel 1 3, frames 303-04 (Univ. Publ'ns of Am). 
1 75. Speech of Hon. James C. Davis of Georgia, in Defense of Constitutional Government, 
and State Sovereignty, Delivered at West Memphis, Ark. (Mar. 31, 1956), reprinted in I 02 CONG. 
REC. 5, 6825 (1956). 
1 76. Id. at 6822. 
177. For this paragraph, see KLARMAN, supra note 1 1 ,  at 429-30 (citing relevant sources). 
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1950s, a powerful Klan element wreaked havoc in Birmingham with a wave 
of unsolved bombings and brutality. The police, under Connor's control, 
declined to interfere. Standing for reelection in 196 1 ,  Connor cultivated ex­
tremists by offering the Ku Klux Klan fifteen minutes of "open season" on 
the Freedom Riders as they rolled into town. Connor won in a landslide. 178 
In 1963 the Southern Christian Leadership Conference ("SCLC") was 
searching for a southern city with a police chief whose violent propensities 
could be counted on to produce televised scenes of police brutality against 
peaceful demonstrators that would shock the nation's conscience. They se­
lected Birmingham because of Connor. The strategy worked brilliantly, as 
Connor soon unleashed police dogs and fire hoses against the demonstra­
tors, many of whom were children. The national news media featured 
images of police dogs attacking unresisting demonstrators, including one 
that President John F. Kennedy reported made him sick. Editorials con­
demned the violence as a national disgrace. Citizens voiced their outrage 
and demanded that politicians take action to immediately end such savagery. 
Within ten weeks, spin-off demonstrations had spread to over 100 cities. 179 
These televised scenes of brutality dramatically altered northern opinion 
on race and enabled passage of the 1 964 Civil Rights Act. Opinion polls 
revealed that the percentage of Americans who deemed civil rights the na­
tion's most urgent issue rose from four percent before Birmingham to fifty­
two percent after. 180 Only after Birmingham did Kennedy announce on na­
tional television that civil rights was a moral issue "as old as the scriptures 
and . . .  as clear as the American Constitution"181 and propose landmark civil 
rights legislation that would end Jim Crow. 182 
Even more than Connor, Governor George Wallace of Alabama personi­
fied the post-Brown racial fanaticism of southern politics.  Early in his 
postwar political career, Wallace had been criticized as soft on segregation. 
By the mid- 1950s, though, Wallace had felt the shifting political winds and 
become an ardent segregationist. In 1 958, Wallace's principal opponent in 
the Alabama governor's race, state attorney general John Patterson, received 
an endorsement from the Ku Klux Klan. Wallace criticized Patterson for not 
repudiating this endorsement, which unwittingly made him the candidate of 
moderation. Patterson easily defeated Wallace, leaving the latter to ruminate 
that "no other son-of-a-bitch will ever out-nigger me again."183 
Wallace made good on that promise in 1962, winning on a campaign 
promise of defying federal integration orders, "even to the point of standing 
178. For this paragraph, see id. at 430-3 1 (citing relevant sources). 
1 79. For this paragraph, see id. at 433-36 (citing relevant sources). 
1 80. 3 GALLUP, supra note 8 1 ,  at 1 8 12, 1 842. 
1 8 1 .  CARL M .  BRAUER, JOHN F. KENNEDY AND THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION 260 ( 1977) 
(quoting Kennedy). 
1 82. For this paragraph, see KLARMAN, supra note 1 1 , at 435-36 (citing relevant sources). 
1 83 .  DAN T. CARTER, THE POLITICS OF  RAGE: GEORGE WALLACE, THE ORIGINS OF  THE NEW 
CONSERVATISM, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS 96 (1995) (footnote omitted). 
For this paragraph generally, see KLARMAN, supra note 1 1 , at 399, 436-37 (citing relevant sources). 
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at the school house door in person."184 He declared in his inaugural address: 
"In the name of the greatest people that have ever trod this earth, I draw the 
line in the dust and toss the gauntlet before the feet of tyranny and I say seg­
regation now, segregation tomorrow, segregation forever."185 
In the summer of 1963, Wallace fulfilled his campaign pledge to stand in 
the schoolhouse door at Tuscaloosa, physically blocking the university's 
entrance before, in a carefully planned charade, stepping aside in the face of 
superior federal force. That September, Wallace used state troops to block 
the court-ordered desegregation of public schools in Birmingham, Mobile, 
and Tuskegee, and he encouraged local extremists to wage a boisterous 
campaign against desegregation. 186 
Threatened with judicial contempt citations, Wallace eventually relented. 
The schools desegregated, but within a week tragedy had struck. Birming­
ham Klansmen, possibly inspired by the governor's protestations that "I 
can't fight federal bayonets with my bare hands,"187 dynamited the Sixteenth 
Street Baptist Church, killing four black schoolgirls. Within hours of the 
bombing, two other black teenagers were killed. It was the largest death toll 
of the civil rights era, and Wallace received much of the blame.188 
Most of the nation was appalled by the murder of innocent schoolchil­
dren. One week after the bombing, tens of thousands of Americans 
participated in memorial services and marches. Northern whites wrote to the 
NAACP to join, to condemn, and to apologize. A white lawyer from Los 
Angeles wrote that "[t]oday I am joining the NAACP; partly, I think, as a 
kind of apology for being caucasian, and for not being in Birmingham to 
lend my physical support."189 A white teenager from New Rochelle wrote: 
"How shall I start? Perhaps to say that I am white, sorry, ashamed, and 
guilty . . . .  Those who have said that all whites who, through hatred, intoler­
ance, or just inaction are guilty are right."190 The NAACP urged its members 
to "flood Congress with letters in support of necessary civil rights legisla­
tion to curb such outrages."191 
Early in 1965, the SCLC brought its voter registration campaign to 
Selma, Alabama, in search of another Birmingham-style victory. King and 
his colleagues chose Selma partly because of the presence there of a law 
1 84. Ribicoff Proposal on Impact Aid Alarms Alabama Educators, So. ScH. NEWS (Nash­
ville), Apr. 1962, at 3.  
1 85. Gov. Wallace Reaffirms Intent to Keep Segregation, So. ScH. NEWS (Nashville), Feb. 
1963, at 10. 
1 86. For this paragraph, see KLARMAN, supra note 1 1 ,  at 437 (citing relevant sources). 
1 87. CARTER, supra note 1 83, at 1 73 (quoting George Wallace). 
1 88. For this paragraph, see KLARMAN, supra note 1 1 ,  at 437-38 (citing relevant sources). 
1 89. Letter from Donald B.  Brown to Roy Wilkins, National Secretary, NAACP (Sept. 1 8, 
1963), microformed on Papers of the NAACP, pt. 20, reel 3, frame 941 (Univ. Publ'ns of Am.). 
190. Letter from Robert E. Feir to Roy Wilkins, National Secretary, NAACP (Sept. 23, 1963), 
microformed on Papers of the NAACP, pt. 20, reel 3, frame 959 (Univ. Publ'ns of Am.). 
1 9 1 .  Press Release, NAACP, NAACP Units Hold Services for Birmingham Bomb Victims 
(Sept. 2 1 ,  1963), microformed on Papers of the NAACP, pt. 20, reel 3, frame 986 (Univ. Publ'ns of 
Am.). 
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enforcement officer of Bull Connor-like proclivities. Dallas County Sheriff 
Jim Clark had a vicious temper, especially when it came to black people 
asserting their civil rights. 192 
Selma proved another resounding success (albeit a tragic one) for the 
civil rights movement, as Clark could not restrain himself from brutalizing 
peaceful demonstrators. The violence culminated in Bloody Sunday, March 
7, 1 965, when county and state law enforcement officers viciously assaulted 
marchers as they crossed the Edmund Pettus Bridge on the way to Mont­
gomery. Governor Wallace had promised that the march would be broken up 
by "whatever measures are necessary."193 That evening, ABC television in­
terrupted its broadcast of Judgment at Nuremberg for a lengthy film report 
of peaceful demonstrators being assailed by stampeding horses, flailing 
194 clubs, and tear gas. 
Most of the nation was repulsed by the ghastly scenes they had watched 
on television. Time reported that "[r]arely in history has public opinion re­
acted so spontaneously and with such fury."195 Over the following week, 
huge sympathy demonstrations took place across the country, and hundreds 
of clergymen flocked to Selma to show their solidarity with King and his 
comrades. U.S. citizens demanded remedial action from their congressmen, 
scores of whom condemned the "deplorable" violence and the "shameful 
display" of Selma and endorsed voting rights legislation.196 On March 15,  
1 965, President Johnson proposed such legislation before a joint session of 
Congress. Seventy million Americans watched on television as the president 
beseeched them to "overcome this crippling legacy of bigotry and injustice" 
and declared his faith that "we shall overcome."197 
It was the brutalization of peaceful black demonstrators by white law 
enforcement officers in the South that repulsed national opinion and led di­
rectly to the passage of landmark civil rights legislation. The post-Brown 
fanaticism of southern politics created a situation that was ripe for violence. 
Much of that violence was encouraged, directly or indirectly, by extremist 
politicians, whom voters rewarded for the irresponsible rhetoric that fo­
mented brutality. By helping to lay bare the violence at the core of white 
B 1 d . d . 198 supremacy, rown acce erate its emise. 
1 92. For this paragraph, see KLARMAN, supra note 1 1 ,  at 440 (citing relevant sources). 
1 93.  STEPHEN L. LONGNECKER, SELMA'S PEACEMAKER: RALPH SMELTZER AND CIVIL RIGHTS 
MEDIATION 1 76 (1 987) (quoting George Wallace); see also CARTER, supra note 1 83, at 249 (noting 
that Wallace's chief law enforcement lieutenant insisted that the governor himself had ordered the 
use of force) . 
1 94 .  For this paragraph, see KLARMAN, supra note 1 1 ,  a t  440-41 (citing relevant sources) . 
1 95. The Nation: Civil Rights, nME, Mar. 1 9, 1 965, at 23, 24. 
1 96. 1 1 1  CONG. REc. 4984-89, 501 4- 1 5  (1 965). 
1 97 .  Lyndon B. Johnson, Special Message to the Congress: The American Promise (Mar. 1 5, 
1 965), in 1 PuBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: LYNDON B. JoHNSON 281 ,  
284 (1 966). For this paragraph generally, see KLARMAN, supra note 1 1 , a t  440-41 (citing relevant 
sources). 
1 98 .  See generally KLARMAN, supra note 1 1 ,  at 385-442 (describing Brown's backlash, the 
violence it fostered, and the counterbacklash that the vi olence incited). 
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B. The Backlash Against Same-Sex Marriage 
It is, of course, too soon to tell what the broader impact of Lawrence 
will be. One might have predicted a fairly mild reaction to a ruling that in­
validated criminal prohibitions on same-sex sodomy, given that such statutes 
were almost never enforced anyway. 199 Yet the response to Lawrence quickly 
became acrimonious.200 Both sides of the gay-rights debate apparently ap­
preciated that the decision would have little practical significance when 
considered narrowly, and thus they shifted their attention to far more con­
troversial issues like same-sex marriage.201 Justice Scalia's dissent in 
Lawrence, which insisted that the majority's  rationale for invalidating 
Texas's ban on same-sex sodomy would logically entail a constitutional 
right for gays to marry, was widely circulated in conservative Christian cir­
cles. 202 At the same time, well-publicized developments in Canada­
including both legislative and judicial recognition of same-sex marital 
rights203 -made the issue of same-sex marriage concrete and "sent shock 
waves through the religious right," according to one prominent social con­
servative. 204 Critics of same-sex marriage in the United States viewed 
developments in Canada as a wakeup call. Ken Connor, president of the 
199. See Lund & McGinnis, supra note 44, at 1 556 (noting, with regard to Lawrence, that one 
is not likely "to see anything like the intense political opposition generated by this decision's most 
important doctrinal ancestor, Roe v. Wade"); id. ("most of the public can be counted on to respond to 
the immediate consequences of Lawrence with a yawn"). 
200. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, How to Reignite the Culture Wars, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2003, 
(Magazine), at 48 (describing how social conservatives swiftly mobilized opposition to Lawrence); 
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, White House Avoids Stand on Gay Marriage Measure, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 
2003, at A22 (noting that conservatives were "outraged" over Lawrence); Thomas, supra note 2 
(describing conservative groups as "apoplectic" over Lawrence). 
201 .  Gerard V. Bradley, Stand and Fight: Don't Take Gay Marriage Lying Down, NAT't. REV., 
July 28, 2003, at 26-28 (warning after Lawrence that "next season may be the last, at least for mar­
riage"); Sarah Kershaw, Adversaries on Gay Rights Vow State-By-State Fight, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 
2003, at AS (noting that in the wake of Lawrence, both sides in the gay-rights debate were "vowing 
an intense state-by-state fight over deeply polarizing questions, foremost among them whether gays 
should be allowed to marry"); Rosen, supra note 200 (noting that liberal activists and social conser­
vatives both thought that Lawrence "made it more likely that lower courts will come to recognize a 
constitutional right to gay marriage"); William Satire, Op-Ed, The Bedroom Door, N.Y. TIMES, June 
30, 2003, at A21 (predicting immediately after Lawrence that gay-rights activists would tum same­
sex marriage into a dominant political issue). 
202. Esther Kaplan, The Religious Right's Sense of Siege is Fueling a Resurgence, NATION, 
July 5, 2004, at 33; Mary Leonard, Gay Marriage Stirs Conservatives Again, BOSTON Gt.OBE, Sept. 
28, 2003, at A l .  
203. See Halpern v. Canada (Att'y Gen.), 6 5  O.R.3d 1 6 1  (Ont. C.A. 2003); Tom Cohen, Doz­
ens in Canada Follow Gay Couple 's Lead, WASH. PoST, June 1 2, 2003, at A25; Clifford Krauss, 
Canadian Leaders Agree to Propose Gay Marriage Law, N.Y. TIMES, June 1 8, 2003, at A l ;  see also 
Clifford Krauss, Canada's Supreme Coun Clears Way for Same-Sex Marriage Law, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 10, 2004, at A 7 (noting that in Canada the high courts of six provinces and one territory, which 
together comprise eighty-five percent of the country's population, have ruled unconstitutional the 
traditional definition of marriage). 
204. Kaplan, supra note 202 (quoting Phil B urress, president of Citizens for Community 
Values in Ohio); see also Clifford Krauss, A Few Gay Americans Tie the Knot in Canada, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 28, 2003, at A2 (noting that the Canadian court decisions, together with Lawrence, 
encouraged the belief among gay-rights groups that barriers to same-sex marriage in the United 
States were vulnerable). 
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Family Research Council, declared, "[u]nless the American people rise up to 
defend this indispensable institution, we could lose marriage in a very short 
time."205 James Dobson, founder of Focus on the Family, warned in a news­
letter in September 2003, "the homosexual activist movement . . .  is poised 
to administer a devastating and potentially fatal blow to the traditional fam­
ily."206 Reverend Jerry Falwell, leader of the now-defunct Moral Majority, 
and Tony Perkins, incoming president of the Family Research Council, both 
announced that they were shifting their attention to the marriage issue and 
committing their full support to the federal marriage amendment.207 The 
Southern Baptist Convention passed a resolution condemning same-sex un­
ions, and the leadership of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops 
endorsed a federal constitutional amendment to ban them.208 The chairman 
of the Republican National Committee, Ed Gillespie, stated for the first time 
that the Republican party platform in 2004 might support a federal marriage 
amendment. 209 
Then, in November 2003, the Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled in 
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health210 that a state law limiting mar­
riage to a union of a man and a woman violated the equality provision of the 
state constitution. A similar ruling in 1 993 by the Hawaii Supreme Court21 1  
had provoked a dramatic political backlash. Within a few years, more than 
thirty states (including Hawaii) and Congress had responded by passing De­
fense of Marriage Acts.212 
Almost immediately after Goodridge, President George W. Bush stated 
that he would "do what is legally necessary to defend the sanctity of mar­
riage."2 13 Many Republican congressional representatives and conservative 
activists went further, demanding a federal constitutional amendment to ex­
plicitly bar same-sex marriage.214 Referring to the Massachusetts ruling, a 
Wisconsin woman warned in the newsletter of Focus on the Family, "Soon 
all of the U.S. will become Sodom and Gomorrah."215 James Dobson wrote 
that the fight against gay marriage would be "our D-day, or Gettysburg or 
205. Christopher Marquis, U.S. Gays Who Marry in Canada Face Hurdles, N. Y. TIMES, June 
1 9, 2003, atA8. 




2 1 0. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
2 1 1 .  Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). 
2 1 2. These laws are listed in EsKRIOOE, supra note 85, app. B3;  see also RIMMERMAN, supra 
note 9 1 ,  at 75 (describing an "enormous conservative backlash" against Baehr). 
2 1 3. Howard Fineman & T. Trent Gegax, 'My Mommies Can Marry,' NEWSWEEK, Dec. 1 ,  
2003, at 34; Katharine Q. Seelye, Conservatives Mobilize Against Ruling on Gay Marriage, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 20, 2003, at A29. 
2 1 4. Maggie Gallagher, Massachusetts v. Marriage, WKLY. STANDARD, Dec. I, 2003, at 2 1 ,  2 1 .  
2 1 5. Kaplan, supra note 202. 
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Stalingrad."216 Within a week, representatives of several conservative groups 
met in Washington, D.C., to plan a national strategy to counter the ruling, 
including demands for a federal marriage amendment.2 17 The president of 
Concerned Women of America, Sandy Rios, declared that her group would 
use the amendment "as a litmus test for offices from president to street 
sweeper," and she warned that if President Bush did not support such an 
amendment, some evangelicals and Roman Catholics would withhold their 
votes in the 2004 presidential election.2 18 The Traditional Values Coalition 
began sending 1 .5 million mailings a month to prospective voters to rally 
support for the marriage amendment.219 Many commentators noted that the 
same-sex marriage issue had quickly supplanted abortion as the principal 
concern of social and religious conservatives.220 
Political analysts now predicted that the same-sex marriage issue would 
"resonate for months and months during the election season"221 and that it 
would be "front and center of the 2004 debate."222 Most recognized that the 
issue was "a real gift" for social conservatives, because "it's revitalized their 
base and revitalized their fund-raising."223 One top advisor to a Democratic 
presidential candidate said, "I got a bad case of acid reflux as soon as I 
heard about it," and a pair of political reporters observed that the decision 
"complicates life for the leading Democratic candidates."224 
Goodridge mandated that same-sex couples be allowed to marry-a 
position that had not carried the day in the popularly elected branches of a 
single state government and that opinion polls showed was rejected by 
2 1 6. Id. 
2 1 7. Seelye, supra note 2 1 3. 
2 1 8. Id. ; see also Fineman & Gegax, supra note 2 1 3  (quoting Gary Bauer of the organization 
American Values, "People would stay home if they thought the party they were investing in wasn't 
willing to go to the mat on this"). 
219.  Kaplan, supra note 202. 
220. Leonard, supra note 202; Seelye, supra note 213.  
22 1 .  James Dao, State Action is Pursued on Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2004, 
at 24. 
222. Morning Edition (Nat'! Pub. Radio broadcast Dec. 26, 2003) (quoting Republican poll­
ster Bill Mcinturff); see also id. (noting that same-sex marriage "will likely be one of the most 
contentious social issues in the 2004 races"). 
223. Kaplan, supra note 202 (quoting Jean Hardisty, founder of Political Research Associates, 
a group that researches the far right); see Andrew Jacobs, Black Legislators Stall Marriage Amend­
ment in Georgia, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2004, at 1 1  (reporting leaders of the Georgia Legislative Black 
Caucus predicting that if a state constitutional amendment barring same-sex marriage got on the 
ballot that fall, Republicans might take over the lower house of the state legislature); Rosen, supra 
note 200 ("If any single Supreme Court decision can reinvigorate the culture wars today, conserva­
tives say, the court has just handed it to them on a silver platter.");  Robin Toner, Same-Sex Marriage, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2004, at A l  (quoting conservative leader Gary Bauer stating that on the issue of 
same-sex marriage, "[t]he public overwhelmingly embraces . . .  the conservative side"); Morning 
Edition, supra note 222, (quoting Democratic pollster Stan Greenberg observing that same-sex 
marriage "has the potential to be a wedge issue [with] . . .  greater risk for the Democrats"). 
224. Fineman & Gegax, supra note 2 1 3; see also Rosen, Immodest Proposal, supra note 4 1 ,  
at 19 (calling Goodridge "politically naive" and predicting that i t  will produce a powerful backlash). 
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national majorities of roughly two to one.225 Although many liberal Democ­
rats support same-sex marriage, other traditionally Democratic 
constituencies-African Americans, the elderly, the working class-generally 
do not. 226 Many Democratic politicians-in the Massachusetts legislature, on 
the presidential campaign trail, and elsewhere-tried to finesse the issue by 
emphasizing their support for civil unions, while opposing same-sex mar­
riage.227 But opinion polls conducted soon after the Massachusetts ruling 
showed that respondents were much more likely to vote for President Bush 
than the as-yet undetermined nominee of the Democratic party after being 
told of their respective positions on same-sex marriage and civil unions.228 
Polls also revealed that when people were read a Democratic statement of 
support for civil unions and a Republican statement of opposition to same­
sex marriage, they overwhelmingly favored the latter position, suggesting 
that the Democrats' preferred strategy of diverting attention from marriage 
to civil unions might not succeed.229 
In February and March of 2004, roughly 4,000 same-sex couples applied 
for and received marriage licenses in San Francisco, where Mayor Gavin 
Newsom announced that the state law restricting marriage to unions be­
tween men and women was, in his opinion, unconstitutional. 230 Same-sex 
couples quickly followed suit in Multnomah County, Oregon (which in­
cludes Portland), where more than 3,000 were married before a state court 
stopped the process. Smaller numbers of same-sex couples received mar-
225. Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Backs Ban in Constitution on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
25, 2004, at A l  (noting an opinion poll taken on February 16-17, 2004 revealing sixty-four percent 
opposing same-sex marriage); Seelye & Elder, supra note 97 (noting another poll showing that 
respondents opposed same-sex marriage by sixty-one percent to thirty-four percent). 
226. See, e.g., David Mattson, The Struggle to Redefine Marriage, NATION, Aug. 1 8, 2003, at 
30 (noting that sixty-three percent of blacks and Hispanics, ordinarily Democratic constituencies, 
supported a federal marriage amendment); State of the Union, THE EcoNOMIST, Nov. 22, 2003, at 30 
(noting that same-sex marriage "could provide Republicans with a powerful lever to pry away work­
ing-class voters [who tend to be more culturally conservative] from the Democratic cause"). 
227. Pam Belluck, Gays ' Victory Leaves Massachusetts Lawmakers Hesitant, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 20, 2003, at A29 (noting that the Massachusetts legislature was dominated by Democrats but 
that many of them, especially those who were Catholic, supported civil unions but not same-sex 
marriage); Duggan, supra note 88, at 14 (noting that most of the candidates for the Democratic 
presidential nomination opposed same-sex marriage but supported civil unions). 
228. See NAT'L Pua. RADIO , supra note 97, figs. 6, 23 (noting that respondents favored Presi­
dent Bush over an unnamed Democratic nominee by forty-six percent to forty-two percent before 
being informed of their respective positions on same-sex marriage and civil unions and by fifty-one 
percent to thirty-five percent after). 
229. Id. fig. 30 (noting that by fifty-five percent to thirty-three percent respondents identified 
more closely with the Republicans' statement in opposition to same-sex marriage than with the 
Democrats' statement in support of civil unions). 
230. Dean E. Murphy, San Francisco Married 4,037 Same-Sex Pairs From 46 States, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 18, 2004, at A26. On August 1 2, 2004, the California Supreme Court ruled that the 
marriage licenses issued by Mayor Newsom were "void and of no legal effect." Lockyer v. City and 
County of S.F., 95 P.3d 459, 464 (Cal. 2004). 
December 2005) Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge) 463 
riage licenses around the same time in Asbury Park, New Jersey,23 1 Sandoval 
C N M . 232 l N k 233 ounty, ew ex1co, and New Pa tz, ew Yor . 
As photographs on the front pages of newspapers and film footage on 
nightly television news programs showed scenes of gay and lesbian couples 
celebrating their marriages outside of city halls across the country, social 
conservatives began mobilizing support for state constitutional amendments 
barring same-sex marriage.234 It was also at this time that President Bush 
finally came out unequivocally in support of a federal marriage amend­
ment. 235 According to the executive director of the Campaign for California 
Families, "There are millions of Americans angry and disgusted by what 
they see on the TV"; he called the issue, "the new civil war in America."236 A 
leader of the Southern Baptist Convention observed, "I have never seen any­
thing that has energized and provoked our grass roots like this issue [same­
sex marriage] , including Roe v. Wade."231 
In Cincinnati, Ohio, a group called Citizens for Community Values be­
gan meeting the day after same-sex couples began marrying in 
Massachusetts; its goal was to ensure that nothing similar would ever hap­
pen in Ohio. The group collected over 500,000 signatures supporting a state 
marriage amendment and registered over 54,000 new voters in the process. 
The group's leader, Phil Burress, later reported, "[w]e would not have had 
this on the ballot if they had not started marrying people on May 17 ."238 
23 1 .  Thomas Crampton, Issuing Licenses, Quietly, to Couples in Asbury Park, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 10, 2004, at BS. 
232. Steve Barnes, New Mexico Gay-Marriage Injunction Stands, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2004, 
at AIS (noting that the clerk in Sandoval County, New Mexico issued sixty-six marriage licenses to 
same-sex couples before being enjoined by a court). 
233. Thomas Crampton, Spitzer and New Paltz Mayor Meet About Gay Marriages, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 1 2, 2004, at B4 (noting that Mayor Jason West of New Paltz conducted marriages for 
twenty-five gay couples before being enjoined by a court). 
234. See, e.g., Cloud, supra note 88 (reporting that the proposed federal marriage amendment 
received a big boost last week when pictures of lesbians kissing their brides were broadcast around 
the world); Dao, supra note 221 (noting that nearly two-dozen state legislatures were considering 
constitutional amendments forbidding same-sex marriage and that the granting of marriage licenses 
to same-sex couples in San Francisco was inspiring much of this activity); id. (noting a conservative 
opponent of gay marriage making the point that "social conservatives had been particularly ener­
gized by the spectacle of San Francisco officials granting marriage licenses to gay couples"); 
Barbara Kantrowitz, The New Face of Marriage, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 1 ,  2004, at 42 (noting that the 
scenes of gays and lesbians marrying in San Francisco had been a provocative call to arms for con­
servatives). But cf Balkin, supra note 69, at 1557 (predicting that the images of same-sex couples 
getting married in San Francisco would play the same role for the gay-rights movement that the 
televised images of Bull Connor attacking the black schoolchildren of Birmingham with fire hoses 
and police dogs had for the civil rights movement). 
235. See, e.g., Bumiller, supra note 225; Duggan, supra note 88, at 14 (noting the political 
storm over same-sex marriage intensifying as gay couples wed in San Francisco and President Bush 
vowed to stop such marriages with a federal constitutional amendment). 
236. Kantrowitz, supra note 234. 
237. David D. Kirkpatrick, Conservatives Using Issue of Gay Unions as a Rallying Tool, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 8, 2004, at I ;  see also id. (noting that the same-sex marriage issue was mobilizing social 
conservatives in a way that no other issue had done in the last several years). 
238. Scott S. Greenberger, Gay-Marriage Ruling Pushed Voters, Mobilized Bush, Left Kerry 
Wary, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 7, 2004, at B 1 .  
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Burress also observed that in his twenty-one years of organizing, "I've never 
seen anything like this . . . .  It's a forest fire with a 100 mile-per-hour wind 
behind it."239 The spokesman for the Defense of Marriage Coalition de­
clared, "[p]eople are three times more passionate on this issue than they 
were even about abortion."240 A leading gay-rights activist expressed concern 
that the Massachusetts ruling was creating "a backlash so much more pow­
erful than our community is prepared to handle."241 Also in May 2004, 
Republican pollster Richard Wirthlin called same-sex marriage "an ideal 
wedge issue," which would enable Republicans to peel away from the De­
mocratic party such socially conservative groups as Catholics and African 
Americans (whose support for same-sex marriage-at twenty-eight per­
cent-was lower than among any other racial group).242 
The eventual presidential nominee of the Democratic party, Senator 
John Kerry, was wary of the issue. He stated repeatedly-to the point of 
obvious exasperation-that he supported civil unions, opposed same-sex 
marriage, but also opposed the federal marriage amendment on the ground 
that states should decide this issue for themselves.243 By contrast, President 
Bush was now regularly calling for a federal amendment,244 and he was fre­
quently referring to Kerry as the senator from Massachusetts-an obvious 
effort to associate his opponent in voters ' minds with that state's court deci-
• • • 245 s1on protectmg same-sex marriage. 
By the summer of 2004, political analysts were reporting that the presi­
dent's reelection campaign had "finally hit on the issue they think may save 
them in the 2 November election: same-sex marriage."246 Focus groups and 
private polls suggested that Republicans could gain significant traction on 
this issue with undecided voters as well as mobilize the party's conservative 
Christian base.247 Political analysts predicted that the issue of same-sex mar­
riage could especially help Republicans in critical swing states such as 
Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Ohio by turning out unusually large numbers 
239. James Dao, Flush with Victory, Grass-Roots Crusader Against Same-Sex Marriage 
Thinks Big, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2004, at A28. 
240. Karen Breslau, A Rising Tide, Rocking Boats, The Politics of Gay Marriage Roil Ore­
gon 's Electoral Terrain, NEWSWEEK, May 17, 2004, at 43, 43 (quoting Tim NashiO. 
24 1 .  Cloud, supra note 8 8  (quoting Matt Foreman o f  the National Gay and Lesbian Task 
Force). 
242. Kaplan, supra note 202; accord Debra Rosenberg, Politics: A Gay-Marriage Wedge, 
NEWSWEEK, June 28, 2004, at 8, 8. 
243. Andrew Stephen, Bush and Cheney Have Hit on the Issue They Believe Will Save Them 
in the 2 November Election-Same-Sex Marriages-and They Are Determined to Use this Weapon, 
NEW STATESMAN, July 26, 2004, at 13 ,  13 .  
244. See, e.g. , Elisabeth B umiller, Bush Talks to an Appreciative Catholic Crowd, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 4, 2004, at A14;  Rosenberg, supra note 242, at 8. 
245. Greenberger, supra note 238. 
246. Stephen, supra note 243; see also Andrew Sullivan, If at First You Don 't Succeed . . .  ,
TIME, July 26, 2004, at 78, 78 (noting that the same-sex marriage issue "is an integral part of the 
Bush re-election campaign"). 
247. See Stephen, supra note 243. 
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of socially conservative voters.248 President Bush declared, "activist judges 
and local officials in some parts of the country are not letting up in their 
efforts to redefine marriage for the rest of America."249 Senator Rick Santo­
rum of Pennsylvania, one of the leading advocates of the federal marriage 
amendment, referred to the recent rash of same-sex marriages and declared, 
"the future of our country hangs in the balance because the future of mar­
riage hangs in the balance."250 
In July, Republicans in the Senate forced a vote on the federal marriage 
amendment. Senator Wayne Allard of Colorado, the main sponsor of the 
amendment, declared, "There is a master plan out there from those who 
want to destroy the institution of marriage."251 Senator Hatch of Utah said, 
"We have had traditional marriage in this world for over 5,000 years . . . .  
This is one of the most important debates in history."252 Senator Santorum 
asked, "Isn't that the ultimate homeland security, standing up and defending 
marriage?"253 James Dobson wrote to his followers, "Barring a miracle, the 
family as it has been known for more than five millennia will crumble, pres­
aging the fall of Western civilization itself."254 Though the amendment was 
defeated on a procedural vote by fifty to forty-eight (suggesting it was some 
nineteen votes shy of the two-thirds majority required to pass),255 it did force 
Democratic senators to go on record in opposition. This almost certainly 
harmed those, such as Minority Leader Tom Daschle of South Dakota, who 
were competing for reelection in states where polls showed overwhelming 
public support for ballot initiatives defining marriage in traditional terms.256 
In early August, voters in Missouri provided a glimpse of what might lie 
ahead when they overwhelmingly endorsed a ballot initiative amending the 
state constitution to define marriage as a union between a man and a 
248. See Fear the Counter-Attack, EcoNOMIST, Aug. 2 1 ,  2004, at 26, 26 (predicting that evan­
gelical Christians, who in Ohio account for a quarter of the electorate, might vote in unusually large 
numbers to defeat same-sex marriage and, in the process, help to reelect Bush); Sarah Kershaw & 
James Dao, Voters in 10 of 11 States Are Seen as Likely to Pass Bans of Same-Sex Marriages, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 28, 2004, at A 1 4  (noting supporters of the state amendments predicting that the ballot 
initiatives would draw more conservatives to the polls and thus might prove critical to Bush in swing 
states); David D. Kirkpatrick, Gay Marriage Becomes a Swing Issue with Pull, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 
2004, at A 7 (noting Celinda Lake, a Democratic pollster who had worked for Human Rights Cam­
paign, conceding that the same-sex marriage issue might help Bush win Ohio); Stephen, supra note 
243, at 14. 
249. Stephen, supra note 243. 
250. Id. 
25 1 .  Sullivan, supra note 246. 
252. 1 50 CONG. REC. S7912 (daily ed . July 1 2, 2004) (statement of Sen. Santorum). 
253. Sullivan, supra note 246. 
254. Id. 
255. See Marriage Amendment May Rise Again, CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Aug. 10, 2004, at JO. 
256. See Rosenberg, supra note 242; see also 1 50 CONG. REc. S8077 (July 14, 2004) (state­
ment of Sen. Leahy of Vermont) ("[T]he Senate leadership has decided that forcing a vote in relation 
to the [Federal Marriage Amendment] will benefit the Republican party politically, from the race for 
the White House to the Senate races."). 
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woman. 257 Voter turnout far exceeded that of any primary election in Mis­
souri over the last quarter-century, and the amendment passed with a 
whopping seventy percent majority, far greater than even its proponents had 
anticipated.258 The Coalition to Protect Marriage in Missouri attributed the 
impressive voter turnout to grassroots mobilizing efforts, including notes 
posted on church bulletin boards and sermons given by preachers to their 
congregations.259 Reacting to the result in Missouri, the leader of Citizens 
for Community Values in Ohio said the same-sex marriage issue has 
"brought the people of faith to the table like I have never seen before."260 In 
September, the Republican party platform "strongly support[ed]" President 
Bush's call for a constitutional amendment to protect marriage.261 
In the end, the political backlash ignited by Lawrence-and, even more 
so, by Goodridge-had several direct consequences. First, thirteen states 
added to their constitutions language defining marriage as a union between a 
man and a woman;262 before 2004, only four states had such provisions in 
their constitutions.263 In none of these thirteen states was the vote close, and 
many gay-rights activists were stunned by the margins of defeat.264 In only 
two states-Michigan and Oregon-did the initiatives win less than sixty 
percent of the vote, and in many states they won approximately seventy-five 
percent.265 In Mississippi, the amendment passed with eighty-six percent of 
the vote. 266 Had Lawrence and Goodridge not focused public attention on the 
issue of same-sex marriage, none of these measures would likely have ap­
peared on the ballot. Marriage rights will now be harder to secure for gays 
and lesbians because state legislatures cannot provide them, and state courts 
cannot interpret state constitutions to protect them. 
257. Monica Davey, Missourians Back Amendment Barring Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
4, 2004, at A l 3  [hereinafter Davey, Missourians Back Amendment] ; Monica Davey, Sharp Reactions 
to Missouri 's Decisive Vote Against Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2004, at A l 7  [hereinafter 
Davey, Sharp Reactions]. 
258. Davey, Sharp Reactions, supra note 257. 
259. Id. ; Davey, Missourians Back Amendment, supra note 257. 
260. Davey, Sharp Reactions, supra note 257. 
26 1 .  2004 REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM: A SAFER WORLD AND A MORE HOPEFUL AMERICA 
83, http://www.gop.cmn/media/2004platform.pdf ("We strongly support President Bush's call for a 
Constitutional amendment that fully protects marriage, and we believe that neither federal nor state 
judges nor bureaucrats should force states to recognize other living arrangements as equivalent to 
marriage."). 
262. See, e.g., Linda Feldmann, How Lines of the Culture War Have Been Redrawn, CHRIS­
TIAN Sci. MONITOR, Nov. 15, 2004, at I .  
263. See, e.g. , Cheryl Wetzstein, States Lining Up to Outlaw Same-Sex 'Marriage, ' WASH. 
TIMES, Nov. 9, 2004, at A3. 
264. Kate Zemike, Groups Vow Not to Let Losses Dash Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 
2004, at A30; see also Kershaw & Dao, supra note 248 (noting five weeks before the election that 
the marriage initiative in Oregon was too close to call and that the national field director for the 
Human Rights Campaign stated, "we're feeling good about Oregon"). 
265. See, e.g., Gina Piccalo, Union and Division, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2004, at E21 .  
266. Id. 
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Second, opposition to same-sex marriage mobilized conservative Chris­
tians to tum out at the polls in 2004 in unprecedented numbers,267 leading 
one social conservative to joke the day after the election that "President 
Bush should send a bouquet of flowers" to the members of the Massachu­
setts Supreme Court.268 In the words of one political analyst, the ballot 
measures "appear to have acted as magnets for thousands of socially con­
servative voters in rural and suburban communities who might not otherwise 
have voted."269 The issue of same-sex marriage not only mobilized the Re­
publican party's base, but it also acted as a "wedge" to dislodge traditionally 
Democratic constituencies such as African Americans, the elderly, and 
working-class Catholics-all of whom voted for President Bush in some­
what larger percentages than they had for other Republican presidential 
candidates in recent elections.270 In exit polls, twenty-two percent of voters 
identified "moral values" as their principal voting issue, and of that group, 
nearly eighty percent supported President Bush.271 Same-sex marriage­
along with abortion and stem-cell research-was widely deemed to be one 
of the dominant moral issues in the campaign. 272 
In closely divided states such as Ohio, the issue of same-sex marriage 
may well have determined the outcome of the presidential election. 273 A 
Democratic strategist in that state bluntly declared that if the marriage 
amendment "had not been on the ballot, John Kerry would have won 
267. See, e.g., James Dao, Same-Sex Marriage Issue Key to Some G.O.P. Races, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 4, 2004, at P4; Piccalo, supra note 265. 
268. Elizabeth Mehren, State Bans on Gay Marriage Galvanize Sides, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 4, 
2004, at 1 1  (quoting Robert Knight, director of the Culture and Family Institute of Concerned 
Women for America); see also Donna Britt, Gay Unions Put Kerry Campaign Asunder, WASH. 
PosT, Nov. 5, 2004, at B l  (observing that the issue of same-sex marriage sparked a firestorm that 
helped consume Kerry's presidential hopes); Dana Hull, Gay-Marriage Opposition Seen as Factor 
Aiding Bush, SAN JosE MERCURY NEWS, Nov. 4, 2004, at 13A (quoting Richard Cizik, vice presi­
dent for governmental affairs at the National Association of Evangelicals, "Five judges in 
Massachusetts and the mayor of San Francisco may have done more to help George W. Bush's cam­
paign then [sic] anything else"); Walter Shapiro, Presidential Election May Have Hinged on One 
Issue: Issue /, USA TODAY, Nov. 5-7, 2004, at 6A (noting that Goodridge "may have been the 
decisive factor in granting Bush a second term"). 
269. Dao, supra note 267. 
270. See Katharine Q. Seelye, Moral Values Cited as a Defining Issue of the Election, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 4, 2004, at P4. 
27 1 .  Id. 
272. See, e.g., Anthony B. Robinson, Making Sense of Moral Surprise During the 2004 Elec­
tion, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 14, 2004, at F l .  
273. See, e.g. , Editorial, Bigotry and Ballots: Gay Marriage Is Repudiated; So Is Faimess, 
PITTSBURGH POST GAZETTE, Nov. 6, 2004, at A 1 6  [hereinafter Bigotry and Ballots](noting that gay 
marriage was high among the moral issues that concerned conservative voters, perhaps decisively in 
states such as Ohio); Greenberger, supra note 238 (quoting Al Cross of the Institute for Rural Jour­
nalism and Community Issues at the University of Kentucky, concluding that "there is plenty of 
analytical and anecdotal evidence out there over the last couple of days that the Republicans hit the 
jackpot with the rural folks in Ohio"); Andrew Sullivan, Uncivil Union, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 22, 
2004, at 1 1  (observing that the same-sex marriage issue may have proved critical to Bush's victory 
in Ohio). But see Charles Krauthammer, 'Moral Values ' Myth, WASH. PosT, Nov. 12,  2004, at A25 
(strongly rejecting the view that the issue of same-sex marriage was responsible for Bush's victory). 
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Ohio."274 Many political analysts credited the ballot measure with spurring 
Republican voter turnout in the socially conservative western and southern 
portions of the state, thus offsetting the unusually high Democratic turnout 
in cities such as Cleveland and Columbus.275 Without the electoral votes of 
Ohio, President Bush would not have been reelected. In his second term, the 
president is widely expected to appoint the sort of conservative judges and 
Justices who will be least likely to extend Lawrence to protect other rights 
of gays and lesbians. Indeed, within weeks of the election, the administra­
tion-as an evident reward to social and religious conservatives for their 
election-day accomplishments-announced that it was renominating ten of 
the most controversial judicial selections from President Bush's first term, 
whose confirmation Democratic senators had blocked through filibuster.276 
Thus, the backlash ignited by Goodridge possibly ensured the reelection of 
a president whose judicial appointments will almost certainly delay the legal 
recognition of same-sex marriage. 277 
Third, the issue of same-sex marriage clearly provided the margin of 
victory for Republican senators in closely fought contests in states such as 
Kentucky and South Dakota. In Kentucky, Senator Jim Bunning was nar­
rowly reelected despite running an almost comically inept campaign against 
an underfunded, relatively unknown opponent, Dr. Daniel Mongiardo.278 In 
the state legislature, Mongiardo had cosponsored the amendment barring 
same-sex marriage that appeared on the November ballot. But, with the con-
274. Shapiro, supra note 268. 
275. Dao, supra note 267; Frank Langfitt, For Most Voters, Values Trumped Terror and Taxes, 
BALT. SUN, Nov. 4, 2004, at I A; Joan Vennochi, Was Gay Marriage Kerry's Undoing?, BosTON 
GLOBE, Nov. 4, 2004, at AIS;  see also Dao, supra (noting a political analyst in Michigan reporting 
that his polls showed that five percent of voters said the ballot initiative on marriage was their main 
motivation for voting). 
276. Eric Gorski, Dobson Shifts Power to Focus on the Politics, DENVER POST, Nov. 14, 2004, 
at A l  (noting James Dobson explaining that he took a higher profile in the 2004 election than previ­
ously because he "had to do everything [he] could to keep the loony left from capturing the United 
States Supreme Court" and declaring that "[f]or many social conservatives, judges are more to 
blame than lawmakers for societal changes over the past 30 years"); Neil A. Lewis, Bush Tries 
Again on Court Choices Stalled in Senate, N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2004, at A l .  
277. See, e.g. , Mickey Wheatley, Op-Ed, For the Moment, Concentrate on Being Civil, L.A. 
TIMES, Nov. 10, 2004, at B i l  (noting that the same-sex marriage issue helped elect Bush and con­
servative senators, whose victory will ensure the appointment of new Supreme Court Justices "likely 
to adjudicate us right out of the constitution"). 
278. John Cheves, Senate Race Should Please Republicans, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, 
May 9, 2004, at A l  ("In recent months, Bunning has exhibited a pattern of putting his foot in his 
mouth."). 
Among other things, in February 2004, Bunning startled civic leaders in Louisville by stating 
that a second new bridge that had been promised to the city would be delayed indefinitely because 
northern Kentucky, where Bunning lives, needed a new bridge to Cincinnati. After the U.S. congres­
sional representative from Louisville corrected Bunning, explaining that he was "confused," 
Bunning denied having made the remarks, despite a television news crew having them on tape. In 
March, Bunning told an audience that his opponent, the olive-skinned son of Italian immigrants, 
looked like the dead sons of former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. Mongiardo demanded an apol­
ogy, but Bunning's campaign denied that he had made the remarks. After eyewitnesses publicly 
confirmed the comments, campaign officials insisted that Bunning had been joking. As some critics 
began raising questions about Bunning's judgment and mental soundness (he was 72 years old), his 
campaign aides began steering him away from public speeches. Id. 
December 2005] Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge) 469 
test unexpectedly tight in the final weeks, state Republican leaders cam­
paigning with Bunning called Mongiardo, a 44-year-old bachelor, " 'limp­
wristed' and a 'switch hitter.' "279 Republican state senator Elizabeth Tori 
said that Mongiardo "is not a gentleman, . . .  I'm not even sure the word 
'man' applies to him."280 Reporters began asking Mongiardo if he was gay 
(he firmly denied that he was).28 1 Late in the campaign, Republicans ran 
commercials that featured the sound of wedding bells, a�ain hinting that 
Mongiardo was weak on the issue of same-sex marriage. 28 Analysts attrib­
uted Bunning's victory to a large turnout of conservative rural voters who 
had been mobilized by the state ballot initiative.283 Because President Bush 
enjoyed commanding leads in Kentucky opinion polls, many conservatives 
might have stayed home were it not for this ballot initiative. A small reduc­
tion in the turnout of such voters would have cost Bunning reelection. 
In South Dakota, John Thune, an evangelical Christian who was chal­
lenging Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle for his seat, made the same­
sex marriage issue "the centerpiece of his campaign," according to one De­
mocratic spokesman.284 With a marriage amendment on the ballot, Thune 
crisscrossed the state warning that the "institution of marriage is under at­
tack from extremist groups . . . . They have done it in Massachusetts and 
they can do it here."285 Like most Democratic candidates for national office 
in the 2004 election, Daschle opposed same-sex marriage but also criticized 
the federal marriage amendment as too drastic a step.286 Thune and Republi­
can Governor Mike Rounds pressed Daschle to explain why he opposed a 
constitutional amendment banning gay marriage that most South Dakotans 
supported.287 The director of Concerned Women for America of South Da­
kota warned that Daschle "has promised the homosexual lobby that he 
would ensure the defeat of the Federal Marriage Amendment."288 James 
279. Sarah Vos, Mongiardo Has Come Far. Fast, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Oct. 30, 2004, 
at A l ;  Amanda York, Pols Lookfor Limp Wrists, KY. PosT, Oct. 30, 2004, at A 1 2. 
280. Bruce Schreiner, GOP's Comments 'Pure Lies,' Mongiardo Says, LEXINGTON HERALD­
LEADER, Oct. 30, 2004, at 84. 
28 1 .  Id. ; Vos, supra note 279. 
282. See Dao, supra note 267; see also Kershaw & Dao, supra note 248 (noting that the pro­
posed state constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage was so popular in Kentucky that 
legislative candidates fought over who supported it first). 
283. Dao, supra note 267; Greenberger, supra note 238. 
284. Dirk Johnson & Debra Rosenberg, The Gay War Rolls On, NEWSWEEK, July 26, 2004, at 
34, 34 (quoting Dan Pfeiffer). 
285. Id. (quoting John Thune); see also Denise Ross, Thune Calls for Ban on Gay Marriage, 
RAPID CITY J., July 9, 2004, available at http://rapidcityjournal.com/articles/2004/07/09/news/local/ 
news04.prt (quoting Thune stating that "[r]unaway courts are trampling the will of the majority in 
this country and the laws in 42 states"). 
286. Ross, supra note 285. 
287. Scott Waltman, Daschle Against Gay Marriage Amendment, ABERDEEN AM. NEWS, Jul. 
14, 2004, at 10, available at 2004 WL 80866264. 
288. Id. (quoting Linda Schauer); see also Gorski, supra note 276 (noting that Focus on the 
Family Action ran a full page advertisement in South Dakota newspapers after Senator Daschle 
blocked the federal amendment, which declared, "Shame on You, Senator Daschle"). 
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Dobson, Tony Perkins, and Gary Bauer, head of American Values, came to 
Sioux Falls and told a crowd of five thousand that if the institution of mar­
riage was not defended from homosexual attack, "it's going to be gone."289 
They criticized Daschle for blocking the federal marriage amendment in the 
Senate and the appointment of federal judges who would uphold school 
prayer.290 In the end, Thune defeated Daschle by fifty-one percent to forty­
nine percent, making Daschle the first party leader in the Senate to be de­
feated in more than fifty years. The state marriage amendment passed by 
roughly seventy-five percent to twenty-five percent. Its presence on the bal­
lot probably rallied enough social conservatives and shifted the stance of 
enough marginal voters to cost Daschle reelection.29 1 
Thus, the backlash ignited by the issue of same-sex marriage probably 
helped Republicans increase their majority in the Senate from fifty-one to 
fifty-five, which will make it harder for Democrats to block the confirmation 
of socially conservative judges. Moreover, socially conservative leaders 
have already begun threatening to "put in the bull's-eye" several Democratic 
senators from states whose electoral votes went to President Bush if they 
continue to block the administration's conservative judicial nominees.292 
Fourth and finally, the public's rejection of same-sex marriage in the 
thirteen state ballot initiatives was so unequivocal-two-thirds of all voters 
on these initiatives rejected same-sex marriage-that social conservatives 
and Republicans are certain not to allow the issue to die.293 Many social con­
servatives have claimed credit for reelecting the president, insisting that 
their efforts to defend the traditional definition of marriage drew millions of 
evangelical Christians to the polls and provided Bush's margin of victory.294 
These groups have already begun flexing their political muscles, promising 
"a battle of enormous proportions from sea to shining sea" if the administra-
289. Ben Shouse, Advocate Promotes Religious Stance, ARGUS LEADER (Sioux Falls, S.D.), 
Oct. 5, 2004, at IB, available at 2004 WLNR 1 6352528 (quoting James Dobson). 
290. Id. 
291 .  See also David D. Kirkpatrick, Evangelical Leader Threatens to Use His Political Mus­
cle Against Some Democrats, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. I ,  2005, at AJO (crediting social conservatives with 
defeating Daschle in South Dakota). 
292. Id. (quoting James Dobson). 
293. Kelly Brewington, 70 Pastors Ready Fight Against Gay Marriage, BALT. SUN, Nov. 17, 
2004, at lB  (noting that opponents of same-sex marriage in Maryland twice failed in the last session 
of the General Assembly to strengthen the statutory limitation on marriage to unions between a man 
and a woman, but that the results of the recent election have inspired them to try again); Nina J. 
Easton, Va. Focus of Battle Over Gay Marriage, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 16, 2005, at A l  (quoting 
Robert H. Knight, director of the Culture & Family Institute, an arm of Concerned Women for 
America, stating that "[t]he smashing election results on Nov. 2 have energized conservatives"). 
294. Alan Cooperman, Same-Sex Bans Fuel Conservative Agenda, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2004, 
at A39; Gorski, supra note 276 (quoting Dobson, "I'm confident President Bush knows who was 
responsible for this election victory"); see also Chris L. Jenkins, Va. GOP Lawmakers Want 
Amendment to Define Marriage, WASH. PosT, Jan. 1 1 , 2005, at B6 (noting that the victories on the 
state ballot initiatives "have energized social conservatives across the country and are credited by 
some with helping President Bush win reelection in November"). 
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tion does not nominate socially conservative judges.293 Moreover, the issue 
of same-sex marriage is very appealing to conservative politicians because 
in virtually every state a clear majority opposes it; by contrast, on other so­
cial issues, such as abortion and stem-cell research, religious conservatives 
occupy minority positions.296 Conversely, the gay-marriage issue makes 
most Democrats very uncomfortable, because they wish neither to support 
same-sex marriage in defiance of the wishes of a clear majority nor to alien­
ate a gay-rights constituency that leans strongly Democratic (and, one might 
surmise, many Democratic politicians privately sympathize with supporters 
f . ) 297 o same-sex mamage . 
Pundits are already predicting that marriage initiatives will be on the 
ballot in ten or twenty more states over the next few years. 298 In Tennessee in 
2004, for example, the two houses of the legislature passed such a measure 
by lopsided votes of eighty-six to five and twenty-eight to one, and they are 
virtually certain to pass it again in 2005, which will put it on the ballot at the 
next election.299 Similarly, Republicans in Congress are certain to push for 
another vote on the federal marriage amendment.300 The day after the 
295. Kirkpatrick, supra note 237; see also Gorski, supra note 276 (noting Dobson warning 
Republicans that they would "pay a severe price" in four years if they refused to consult with con­
servative Christians who had returned them to power and concluding that "Dobson stands to be a 
force during President Bush's second term"); Evelyn Nieves, Gay Rights Groups Map Common 
Agenda, WASH. PosT, Jan. 17, 2005, at A3 (noting that conservative religious groups are lobbying 
hard for federal judges who will oppose same-sex marriage). 
296. Linda Feldmann, How Lines of the Culture War Have Been Redrawn, CHRISTIAN Sci. 
MONITOR, Nov. 1 5, 2004, at 1 ;  Kaplan, supra note 202. 
297. See Easton, supra note 293 (noting the awkward position that proposed state marriage 
amendments create for one Democratic presidential prospect, Mark Warner, the governor of Vir­
ginia, and quoting a Republican state legislator who has been a leading proponent of such an 
amendment, "Politicians love halfway houses . . . .  But on this, there ain't no halfway house. War­
ner's doing the John Kerry dance."). 
298. Brad Knickerbocker, Political Battles over Gay Marriage Still Spreading, CHRISTIAN 
Sc1. MONITOR, Nov. 29, 2004, at l (noting that amendments to ban gay marriage are likely to be on 
the ballot in at least a dozen more states in 2006); Adam Liptak, Caution in Court for Gay Rights 
Groups, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2004, at Al6 (reporting the views of Mathew Staver, president and 
general counsel of Liberty Council, a public interest law firm representing religious causes); Nieves, 
supra note 295 (noting that conservative groups are seeking marriage amendments in fifteen more 
states); Wetzstein, supra note 263. 
299. Wetzstein, supra note 263; see also Easton, supra note 293 (noting that conservatives in 
the Virginia legislature have proposed several versions of a marriage amendment and that one of 
them is virtually certain to pass in 2005 and to appear on the ballot in 2006). 
300. Rove Says Marriage Amendment on Bush 's Agenda, FRONTRUNNER, Nov. 8, 2004, avail­
able at LEXIS, News Library, Cumews File (noting that Karl Rove stated that President Bush would 
definitely use his second term to push for a constitutional amendment banning gay marriage); see 
also Nieves, supra note 295 (noting that since the election, conservatives in Congress have been 
emboldened in their support of the federal marriage amendment). 
Some doubt has arisen since the election over the White House's commitment to pushing such 
an amendment in the near term. See Jim VandeHei & Michael A. Fletcher, Bush Upsets Some Sup­
poners, WASH. PosT, Jan. 19, 2005, at A l l  (noting that President Bush came under fire from some 
social conservatives for saying in a recent interview that he would not aggressively lobby the Senate 
to pass a constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage, though the White House later 
sought to clarify that the president remained as committed as ever to barring same-sex marriage); 
see also Richard W. Stevenson, White House Again Backs Amendment on Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 17, 2005, at A 1 5  (same). 
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election, James Dobson, who had weekly strategy sessions with the presi­
dent's top political advisor Karl Rove during the election, called for a 
renewed push for the amendment.301 The amendment will pick up support 
among newly elected senators and representatives, as some lawmakers feel 
pressure from constituents as a result of the successful ballot initiatives.302 
Finally, in this changed political environment, it seems unlikely that many 
state court judges will stick out their necks by duplicating the adventurous 
holding of the Massachusetts high court in Goodridge.303 
Indeed, some gay-rights activists have concluded since the election that 
their aggressive push for same-sex marriage played into the hands of social 
conservatives and Republicans and that such litigation should cease until 
public opinion has become more receptive; the gay-rights agenda should 
focus instead on securing reforms such as civil unions and partnership bene­
fits. 304 An openly gay officeholder in California questioned "the strategic 
wisdom of pushing forward an issue that draws vehement opposition from 
nearly two-thirds of voters."305 One gay-rights activist observed that "[o]ur 
legal strategy is at least 10 years ahead of our political and legislative strat­
egy," and another warned that if same-sex marriage advocates won in court, 
it would be "like pouring gasoline onto the fire for purposes of the federal 
301 .  Alan Cooperman, Same-Sex Bans Fuel Conservative Agenda, WASH. PosT, Nov. 4, 2004, 
at A39; see also Easton, supra note 293 (noting that social conservatives view the successful ballot 
initiatives in 2004 "as a national mandate to move forward with more constitutional change, includ­
ing another attempt at passing an amendment in Congress"); VandeHei & Fletcher, supra note 300 
(quoting Tony Perkins of the Family Research Council, "I believe there is no more important issue 
for the president's second term than the preservation of marriage"). 
302. Knickerbocker, supra note 298. 
303. Such challenges are already under way in the courts of several states. See, e.g., Kristen A. 
Grahan, New Jersey Appeals Court Hears Same-Sex Marriage Case, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 8, 
2004, at A20 (noting that an intermediate New Jersey appeals court heard argument in a recent case 
seeking a right for gays and lesbians to marry); Thomas J. Lueck, State Justice Rules Against 13 
Couples Seeking Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. 1IMES, Dec. 8, 2004, at B4 (noting that in the last two 
months two state trial judges in New York have rejected a right to same-sex marriage under the state 
constitution). 
This is not to say that courts will desist from expanding the rights of gays and lesbians in other 
contexts where public opinion is more supportive. See infra notes 384-385 and accompanying text. 
304. John M. Broder, Groups Debate Slower Strategy on Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 
2004, at A l  (noting that leaders of the gay rights movement are embroiled in a bitter debate over 
whether they should moderate their goals after the election losses, with some groups, such as the 
Human Rights Campaign, the nation's largest gay and lesbian advocacy group, favoring less empha­
sis on legalizing same-sex marriage); Knickerbocker, supra note 298 (noting Matt Foreman of the 
National Gay and Lesbian Task Force stating that gay rights advocates had made a mistake by lob­
bying lawmakers and filing lawsuits before building sufficient grassroots support); Liptak, supra 
note 298 (noting Matthew Coles, Director of the Lesbian and Gay Rights Project of the American 
Civil Liberties Union, stating that winning too soon in court would mean losing in the court of pub­
lic opinion and concluding that "we are unprepared for the consequences of winning"); Michelle 
Mittelstadt, Election Day Defeat on Same-Sex Marriage Issue Sparks Debate, DALLAS MORNING 
NEWS, Nov. 1 6, 2004, at I IA (noting that many gay and lesbian leaders concluded after the election 
that they had pushed too hard, too fast for same-sex marriage). 
305. Susan P. Kennedy, Blinded by the Cause of Same-Sex Marriage, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 2 1 ,  
2004, at B5. 
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marriage amendment."306 Democratic strategists are struggling to figure out a 
way to neutralize an issue that seems sure to benefit Republicans in the short 
term.301 
C. Why Backlash ? 
Court rulings such as Brown and Goodridge produce political back­
lashes for three principal reasons: They raise the salience of an issue, they 
incite anger over "outside interference" or "judicial activism," and they alter 
the order in which social change would otherwise have occurred. 
Brown was harder to ignore than earlier changes in southern racial prac­
tices. Most white southerners did not see black jurors or black police 
officers, who policed black neighborhoods only, and they would have been 
largely unaware of the dramatic increases in black voter registration that had 
occurred since World War II. Even some instances of integration-such as 
on city buses or golf courses-would have gone unnoticed by many white 
southerners.308 But they could not miss Brown, which received front-page 
coverage in virtually every newspaper in the country and was a constant 
topic of southern conversations.309 A northern white visitor found after 
Brown that segregation "is the foremost preoccupation of the Southern 
mind . . . .  [It] intrudes into almost every conversation. It nags, it bothers and 
306. Liptak, supra note 298 (reporting views of Matt Foreman of the National Gay and Les­
bian Task Force and quoting Mathew Staver, president and general counsel of Liberty Council); see 
also Tim Evans, Same-Sex Marriage Ruling Due, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Jan. 1 6, 2005, at B 1 (noting 
that one of the couples serving as plaintiffs in a case challenging Indiana's ban on same-sex mar­
riage is no longer certain that a victory is desirable, given that it might inspire a state constitutional 
amendment overturning the result). 
Other gay-rights activists strenuously disagree with the idea of temporarily relegating demands 
for same-sex marriage to the backbumer. See, e.g., Yvonne Abraham, Gay Rights Advocates Split 
Over Taking Softer Course, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 1 3, 2004, at A l  (noting that supporters of Cheryl 
Jacques, former head of the Human Rights Campaign, report that she was forced out of office be­
cause she wanted to continue pushing for full marriage rights for gays and lesbians in spite of the 
election results and that the organization's board of directors believed, to the contrary, that the lesson of 
the election was that same-sex marriage was a losing issue at this time); Broder, supra note 304 (noting 
that Jonathan Katz, executive coordinator of the Larry Kramer Initiative for Lesbian and Gay Studies at 
Yale University, rejected this sort of retrenchment as completely wrong and stated that achieving mar­
riage rights was fundamental to winning equality for gays and lesbians); Evelyn Nieves, Gay 
Activists Refuse to Bargain Away Rights, WASH. POST, Dec. 10, 2004, at A2 (noting that dozens of 
prominent advocates for gay rights sent a letter to every member of Congress criticizing a report that 
the Human Rights Campaign was planning to moderate its position on same-sex marriage). 
307. David D. Kirkpatrick & Katie Zezima, Supreme Court Tums Down a Same-Sex Mar­
riage Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2004, at A20; see also Easton, supra note 293 (noting the 
uncomfortable position that proposed constitutional bans on same-sex marriage create for Democ­
ratic presidential prospects such as Mark Warner, the governor of Virginia, who would like to 
neutralize cultural issues that have harmed Democrats in the South). 
308. For examples, see ADAM FAIRCLOUGH, RACE & DEMOCRACY: THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
STRUGGLE IN LOUISIANA, 1 9 1 5-1972, at 153  ( 1995), and Miscellaneous, So. SCH. NEWS (Nash­
ville), May 1958, at 5. 
309. Thomas F. Pettigrew, Desegregation and Its Chances for Success: Northern and South­
ern Views, 35 Soc. FORCES 339, 341 tbl.3 ( 1957). 
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it will not be ignored."3 10 One white-supremacist leader credited the Court 
with "awaken[ing] us from a slumber of about 30 years,"3 1 1 and an Alabama 
public official noted that white southerners owed the Justices "a debt of 
gratitude" for "caus[ing] us to become organized and unified."312 
Lawrence and, to an even greater extent, Goodridge, have dramatically 
raised the salience of gay-rights issues. Many other reforms on issues of 
sexual orientation-such as repeal of criminal prohibitions on sodomy, ex­
pansion of partnership benefits, and enactment of statutory protections 
against discrimination in employment and public accommodations-have 
occurred without riveting public attention.313 Since Goodridge, though, 
same-sex marriage has constantly captured front-page newspaper headlines, 
and the issue received enormous attention during the 2004 presidential elec­
tion campaign.3 14 Court rulings such as Lawrence and Goodridge forced 
people who previously had not paid much attention to gay-rights issues to 
notice what has been happening and to form an opinion on it. As one social 
conservative observed not long after the Massachusetts decision, "the more 
people focus on [gay marriage], the less they support it."315 Another critic of 
same-sex marriage noted that Goodridge "slapped American Christians in 
their face and woke them up."316 In the spring of 2004 in Oregon, the Chris­
tian Coalition sent out 75,000 voter guides opposing the reelection of Justice 
Rives Kistler of the state supreme court, denouncing him as "the only open 
homosexual supreme court judge in the nation"; it was the same-sex mar­
riage issue that had given salience to the jurist's sexual orientation.317 
3 10 .  Hamilton Basso, Letter to the Editor, To Understand the South, N.Y. nMES, Apr. 10, 
1955, at E l O .  
3 1 1 .  Councils ' Plan Told, So. SCH. NEWS (Nashville), Apr. 1955, at 3 (quoting a southern 
banker) . 
3 1 2. What They Say, So. SCH . NEWS (Nashville), Nov. 1959, at 16 (quoting Alabama Attorney 
General MacDonald Gallion). 
3 1 3. See, e.g., Cloud, supra note 88 (noting a dramatic expansion in partnership benefits over 
the last ten years). 
3 14 .  See, e.g., Dan Gilgoff, The Morals and Values Crowd, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 
1 5, 2004, at 42 ("Gay marriage wasn't a national issue until the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court effectively legalized it last November."). 
3 1 5. Seelye & Elder, supra note 97 (quoting Rev. Lou Sheldon, chairman of the Traditional 
Values Coalition);  see also Lynn Vincent, Coun's Eye for the Married Guy, WORLD MAG., Dec. 6, 
2003, available at http://www.worldmag.com/displayarticle.cfm?id=8333 (quoting a congressional 
representative who supports a federal constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage, who 
stated that until Goodridge, "[a] lot of people didn't realize the gravity of the situation . . . .  Some­
times it takes something like this to jolt people into action ."). 
3 16 .  Vincent, supra note 3 15;  see also Kaplan, supra note 202, at 33 (quoting Phil Burress, 
president of Citizens for Community Values in Ohio, stating that "I'm beginning to think this was a 
good thing for America, because it woke people up."). 
3 1 7 .  Breslau, supra note 240. 
The Oregon Christian Coalition promised to challenge Kistler's fitness to serve on moral 
grounds: "We'll give the people of Oregon information on who they want as a judge, a man who 
believes family is as important as it has been for thousands of years or a man doing what in the past 
has been against law and is against moral law." Charles E. Beggs, Gay Issue Will Arise in Court 
Race, AP Newswires, Mar. 2 1 ,  2004, available at http://www.kgw.com/news-local/stories/ 
kgw_0321 04_news_election_gayjudge_.aa280c6d.html. Kistler survived the challenge, but with 
December 2005] Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge) 475 
The second reason that rulings such as Brown and Goodridge produce 
political backlashes is that judicially mandated social reform may mobilize 
greater resistance than change accomplished through legislatures or with the 
acquiescence of other democratically operated institutions. Brown repre­
sented federal interference in southern race relations-something that white 
southerners, harboring deep historical resentments over military rule and 
"carpetbag" government during Reconstruction-could not easily tolerate.3 18 
Some earlier changes in racial practices-such as the hiring of black police 
officers or the desegregation of minor-league baseball teams-flowed from 
choices made by white southerners rather than from judicial decrees. Other 
changes-such as increases in public spending on black schools and the 
growth of black voter registration-had been influenced by federal court 
decisions, but they still depended on choices made by southern whites. 
Brown was different; it left southern whites no choice but to desegregate 
their schools. Accordingly, Brown was "viewed by many white Southerners 
as federal intervention designed to destroy their way of life."3 19 
Goodridge, decided by the Massachusetts Supreme Court, cannot be 
seen as outside interference-at least with regard to ramifications for Mas­
sachusetts-in the same way that white southerners tended to regard the 
U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Brown. However, because it was a court deci­
sion, rather than a reform adopted by voters or popularly elected legislators, 
critics were able to deride it as the handiwork of arrogant "activist judges" 
defying the will of the people. 32° Ken Starr, a former federal appeals court 
judge, solicitor general, and independent counsel, called Goodridge "a terri­
ble judicial usurpation of the power of the people through their elected 
representatives to fashion social policy."32 1  Karl Rove declared that President 
Bush believed that "5,000 years of human history should not be overthrown 
by the acts of a few liberal judges."322 The president himself stated during 
one of the presidential debates, "I'm deeply concerned that judges are 
just sixty percent of the vote-in a state where appellate judges rarely face serious challenges for 
reelection. 2004 Primary Election Results, STATESMAN J. (Salem, Or.), May 20, 2004, at 2A. 
3 1 8. Robert H. Jackson, Draft Memorandum, supra note 29, at 3 (noting that white southern­
ers, "harbor[ing] in historical memory, with deep resentment, the program of reconstruction and the 
deep humiliation of carpetbag government imposed by conquest," viscerally rejected outside inter­
ference). 
3 19. DAYBREAK OF FREEDOM: THE MONTGOMERY Bus BOYCOTT 208 (Stewart Bums ed., 1997) 
(quoting Bayard Rustin's report on his visit to Montgomery during the bus boycott, March 2 1 ,  1956). 
320. See, e.g., Bumiller, supra note 225 (quoting President Bush defending a federal marriage 
amendment as necessary because of "activist judges" redefining marriage); Lisa Schiffren, Op-Ed, 
How the Judges Forced the President's Hand, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 2004, § 4, at 1 3  (arguing that 
"four Massachusetts judges, looking to bring about radical social change from the bench, decided 
that their commonwealth must begin performing same-sex marriages" and that "[w]hether you favor 
gay marriage or not, it should be a concern when judges . . .  decide to circumvent the democratic 
process on a core issue"); Seelye & Elder, supra note 97 (quoting Rep. Marilyn Musgrave, sponsor 
of a constitutional amendment to ban gay marriage, criticizing "activist judges" and observing that 
"if the definition of marriage is to be changed, it should be done by the American people, not four 
judges in Massachusetts"). 
32 1 .  Seelye, supra note 2 13. 
322. Rove Says Marriage Amendment on Bush 's Agenda, supra note 300. 
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making those decisions, and not the citizenry of the United States."323 Even a 
prominent gay-rights activist such as Andrew Sullivan, former editor of the 
New Republic, conceded that "[c]ourt-imposed mandates rub people the 
wrong way, even those who support including gay couples within the family 
structure."324 The Goodridge ruling on same-sex marriage contrasts with 
other gay-rights reforms such as decriminalization of same-sex sodomy or 
the expansion of antidiscrimination laws to cover sexual orientation, where 
legislatures have been the driving force. 
Moreover, because the Full Faith & Credit Clause of the federal consti­
tution conceivably-though doubtfully-would place other states under 
some obligation to respect Massachusetts marriages, critics of Goodridge 
were able to rally support for a federal constitutional amendment, which 
was said to be necessary to protect the rest of the nation from the "activist 
judges" of Massachusetts.325 To be sure, in light of the well-recognized pub­
lic policy exception to the Full Faith & Credit Clause and in light of the 
Defense of Marriage Act passed by Congress in 1 996, Goodridge probably 
would have no binding effect outside of Massachusetts even without such an 
amendment.326 But the ability of critics of same-sex marriage to rally support 
for a constitutional amendment depended less on the reality of the extraterri­
torial impact of Goodridge than on its perceived consequences;  moreover, 
these critics were able to sow doubts as to what "activist judges" might do 
with the Defense of Marriage Act.327 Thus, two prominent conservative 
scholars insisted that a federal marriage amendment was necessary to pre­
vent "liberal state judges, abetted by sympathetic Justices on the Supreme 
Court of the United States [from] foist[ing] same-sex marriage upon the 
whole nation."328 Senator Trent Lott of Mississippi warned, "sadly, it is only 
a matter of time before the Defense of Marriage Act is overturned by un-
323. David von Drehle, Take the Issues to the People, Not to the Couns, WASH. POST, Nov. 
14, 2004, at B4. 
324. Id. ; see also Cloud, supra note 88 (quoting Glenn Stanton, spokesman for Focus on the 
Family, stating that critics of Goodridge "don't know which to be more outraged at-the death of 
marriage or the death of democracy"). 
325. See, e.g., 1 50 CONG. REc. S791 l (daily ed. July 12, 2004) (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("an 
obscure supreme court in Massachusetts . . .  is deciding this issue for all of America"); Dao, supra 
note 221 (noting a Georgia legislator emphasizing the need for a state constitutional amendment 
forbidding same-sex marriage because of "activist judges"). 
326. See, e.g. , Rauch, supra note 1 5 1  (quoting some lawyers stating that the Full Faith & 
Credit Clause has never been interpreted to require states to recognize marriages that contravene 
their public policy and noting that this conservative Supreme Court is not about to overturn the 
Defense of Marriage Act). 
327. E.g., Pam Belluck, Massachusetts Gives New Push to Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 
2004, at A6 (noting Tony Perkins, president of the Family Research Council, warning, "If same-sex 
couples 'marry' in Massachusetts and move to other states, the Defense of Marriage Act will be left 
vulnerable to the same federal courts that have banned the Pledge of Allegiance and sanctioned 
partial-birth abortion"); Bumiller, supra note 225 (quoting President Bush warning that the Defense 
of Marriage Act might itself be struck down by "activist courts"); see also Schiffren, supra note 320 
(warning that "[u]ndoubtedly, there are more judges across the country waiting for their chance to 
be creative, too"). 
328. George & Tubbs, supra note 147. 
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elected Federal judges who 'find' rights in the U.S. Constitution which sim­
ply are not there."329 The Republican party's platform in 2004 proclaimed 
that "anything less than a Constitutional amendment, passed by the Con­
gress and ratified by the states, is vulnerable to being overturned by activist 
judges."330 Another conservative activist warned, "[  w ]e are in a race between 
the federal courts and the marriage amendment."33 1 
Third and perhaps most important, court decisions produce backlashes 
by commanding that social reform take place in a different order than might 
otherwise have occurred. On subjects such as race and sexual orientation, 
public attitudes often vary across a range of issues. Under Jim Crow, whites 
were generally more opposed to interracial marriage and the integration of 
grade schools than they were to desegregating transportation or permitting 
blacks to vote.332 Similarly, heterosexuals today tend to be far more commit­
ted to preventing same-sex marriage than to barring same-sex "civil unions" 
or to permitting employers to discriminate based on sexual orientation.333 
Heterosexuals are least determined to retain criminal prohibitions on private, 
consensual, adult same-sex sodomy. 334 
By the early 1950s, many southern cities had relaxed Jim Crow in public 
transportation, police-department employment, athletic competitions, and 
voter registration.335 Yet white southerners were more adamant about pre­
serving grade-school segregation, which lay near the top of the white­
supremacist hierarchy of preferences. Blacks, conversely, were often more 
interested in voting, ending police brutality, securing decent jobs, and re­
ceiving a fair share of public education funds than in desegregating grade 
schools. These partially inverse hierarchies of preference among whites and 
blacks opened space for political negotiation (to the extent that blacks had 
the power to compel whites to bargain). Before Brown, many politicians in 
the South had built successful careers by supporting populist economic poli­
cies while quietly backing gradual racial reform.336 Brown made that 
329. 1 50 CoNG. REC. S7923 (daily ed. July 1 2, 2004) (statement of Sen. Lott); see also id. at 
S7925 (statement of Sen. Brownback of Kansas) ("The choice is clear: Either we amend the Consti­
tution and protect the rights of the people to self-determination in this process or the Constitution 
will be amended, in effect, by the edict of judges."). 
330. 2004 REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM, supra note 261 ;  see also 150 CONG. REC. S7908 
(daily ed. July 1 2, 2004) (statement of Sen. Santorum) (warning that without a federal constitutional 
amendment, "the States will be powerless to defend themselves against these runaway judges"). 
Republicans in the House passed a measure to strip federal courts of jurisdiction in cases deal­
ing with the Defense of Marriage Act. H.R. 3 3 1 3, 1 08th Cong. (2004). 
33 1 .  Kirkpatrick & Zezima, supra note 307. 
332. I GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN 
DEMOCRACY 60-6 1 ,  587-88 ( 1944). 
333. See infra note 390 and accompanying text. 
334. See infra notes 340-345 and accompanying text. 
335. See KLARMAN, supra note 1 1 ,  at 1 88-90. 
336. NUMAN V. BARTLEY & HUGH D. GRAHAM, SOUTHERN POLITICS AND THE SECOND RE­
CONSTRUCTION 25, 33-37, 50 (1975); EARL BLACK, SOUTHERN GOVERNORS AND CIVIL RIGHTS: 
RACIAL SEGREGATION AS A CAMPAIGN ISSUE IN THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION 29-3 1 ,  37-39, 41-
45 (1976). 
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approach untenable by forcing to the forefront an issue-racial segregation 
of public schools-on which most white southerners were unwilling to com­
promise. Brown thus virtually ensured a backlash among southern whites.337 
Had the Court first decided a case such as Gayle v. Browder,338 which re­
quired the desegregation of local bus transportation, the reaction of white 
southerners would probably have been less vitriolic. Indeed, southern whites 
had shown far greater restraint in response to earlier Court decisions invali­
dating the white primary and striking down segregation in graduate and 
c . l d . 339 pro1ess10na e ucation. 
By contrast, Lawrence dealt with an issue on which heterosexuals are 
most tolerant of change. Whatever most Americans today think of same-sex 
marriage or gays openly serving in the military, few favor punishing the pri­
vate sexual conduct of gays and lesbians.340 As one leading social 
conservative put it after Lawrence, "even most Christians believe that what 
is done in the privacy of one's home is not the government's business."341 In 
1 96 1  all fifty states punished same-sex sodomy; in 1 986 only twenty-five 
did so; and only thirteen states did so at the time of Lawrence (and only four 
of these had statutes that were explicitly addressed to same-sex sodomy).342 
Even in those holdout states, virtually no prosecutions actually occurred.343 
Thus, Lawrence was about as (politically) easy a constitutional case as the 
Court ever confronts: The Justices were asked to translate into constitutional 
law a social norm that commanded overwhelming popular support.344 Thus, 
they probably anticipated a relatively placid response to their ruling, unlike 
in Brown, where some of the Justices expected white southerners to respond 
with violence and school closures. 345 
Goodridge produced a political backlash for the same reason that Brown 
did. By the early twenty-first century, most Americans were willing to ac­
cept decriminalization of same-sex sodomy, statutory bans on employment 
337. See KLARMAN, supra note 1 1 , at 391-92 (citing relevant sources). 
338. 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam), ajj'g 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956). 
339. KLARMAN, supra note 1 1 ,  at 238-39, 254-55, 393. 
340. See, e.g., 1 50 CONG. REc. S791 2  (daily ed. July 12, 2004) (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("I 
believe gay people ought to be able to do whatever they believe they should in the privacy of their 
own homes, but I don't think they should have the right to redefine traditional marriage."). 
34 1 .  Rosen, supra note 200, at 5 0  (quoting Paul M .  Weyrich) . 
342. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.  558, 573 (2003). 
343. Id. ; see also Dean E. Murphy, Gays Celebrate, and Plan Campaign for Broader Rights, 
N.Y. nMES, June 27, 2003, at A20 (noting that in Harris County, Texas, Lawrence was the only 
person prosecuted for same-sex sodomy in at least twenty-two years). 
344. Robin Finn, After Battling for Gay Rights, Time to Shift Energies, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 
2003, at B2 (quoting Ruth E. Harlow, former legal director of the Lambda Legal Defense and Edu­
cation Fund, observing that in Lawrence "the majority of the court caught up with the vast majority 
of Americans"); Lund & McGinnis, supra note 44, at 1 556 (observing that "[i]f the Court was look­
ing for a case in which to flex its political muscles with impunity, it could hardly have found a better 
candidate"); Sunstein, supra note 52, at 27 (describing Lawrence as "judicial invalidation of a law 
that had become hopelessly out of touch with existing social convictions"); Thomas, supra note 2, at 
40 (noting that the Court in Lawrence was ·�ust catching up to public opinion"). 
345. KLARMAN, supra note 1 1 ,  at 294. 
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discrimination based on sexual orientation, and perhaps even civil unions for 
same-sex couples.346 Before Lawrence and, even more so, Goodridge gave 
same-sex marriage special prominence, many Democratic politicians­
including most of those competing for the party's presidential nomination in 
2004--supported civil unions, but not formal marriage, for gays and lesbi­
ans.347 This compromise position was an effort to appeal to homosexual 
voters, who disproportionately support the Democratic party, without alien­
ating those heterosexuals who are willing to countenance progressive 
change on issues involving sexual orientation but not same-sex marriage.348 
After Goodridge, that compromise position became untenable. With gay 
and lesbian couples demanding marriage licenses across the country, it be­
came harder to divert public attention from same-sex marriage to civil 
unions. Democratic politicians such as Senator Kerry continued to empha­
size their opposition to same-sex marriage, but voters found their nuanced 
position-opposing same-sex marriage but also opposing a federal constitu­
tional amendment to ban it-less palatable than the straightforward 
condemnation of same-sex marriage provided by most Republicans.349 Com­
pounding his problems, Kerry's vote against the federal Defense of 
Marriage Act in 1996 made his professed opposition to same-sex marriage 
less credible than President Bush's.350 
One reason Democrats had difficulty finessing the issue is that those 
voters opposed to same-sex marriage tend to be more passionate than those 
who support it or those who profess neutrality. (This was also true with re­
gard to attitudes toward public school desegregation in the 1950s; southern 
whites were far more adamantly opposed to the change than northern whites 
were to supporting it.35 1) For example, in Ohio, the drop-off in voting be­
tween the presidential race and the ballot initiative on marriage was six 
percent in heavily Democratic areas but only 1 .5 percent in socially 
346. NAT'L Pus. RADIO, supra note 97, fig. 1 4  (noting that at the end of 2003, Americans 
opposed civil unions by only forty-nine percent to forty-two percent); Gallup Poll, May 5-7, 2003, 
Public Opinion Online, The Roper Center, University of Connecticut, accession # 0429847, avail­
able at Westlaw, Public Opinion Online Database (noting that Americans by sixty-two percent to 
thirty-five percent favor the same legal rights to health care benefits and Social Security survivor 
benefits for same-sex couples as for married couples). 
347. See, e.g. , NAT'L Pus. RADIO, supra note 97 (noting in December 2003 that Democratic 
voters favored civil unions by fifty-five percent to forty percent while Republicans opposed them by 
sixty-three percent to twenty-seven percent); Belluck, supra note 327 (noting that many Massachu­
setts legislators "had supported civil unions but not gay marriage and were hoping the court would 
not force them to make an all-or-nothing decision"); Morning Edition, supra note 222 (noting that 
major Democratic candidates for president opposed gay marriage but supported civil unions). 
348. See Vincent, supra note 3 1 5  (noting that "Democratic presidential hopefuls . . .  are trying 
to preserve their political liberal base by expressing support for Goodrich [sic] while straining not to 
alienate centrists in the general electorate with a wholesale endorsement of what remains a radical 
notion"). 
349. Bigotry and Ballots, supra note 273; Greenberger, supra note 238. 
350. 1 50 CONG. REc. S791 l (daily ed. July 1 2, 2004) (statement of Sen. Santorum) (quoting 
Senator Kerry in September 1996 stating that the Defense of Marriage Act "does violence to the 
spirit and letter of the Constitution"). 
35 1 .  KLARMAN, supra note 1 1 , at 365-66. 
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conservative Shelby County, which voted more heavily for Bush than any 
other county in the state. 352 A report by the Pew Research Center in February 
2004 found that among the third of Americans supporting same-sex mar­
riage, only six percent would refuse to vote for a candidate who opposed 
that reform. But among the two-thirds of Americans who oppose same-sex 
marriage, thirty-four percent would refuse to support a political candidate 
who did not share their view; that number increased to fifty-five percent 
among evangelical Christians. 353 Further, it is striking that eight of the eleven 
state ballot initiatives that passed on November 2, 2004 rejected civil unions 
as well as same-sex marriage, despite election-day exit polls revealing that 
sixty-two percent of Americans support either marriage or civil unions for 
same-sex couples. This result suggests that voters were much more intensely 
opposed to same-sex marriage than they were supportive of civil unions.354 
Decisions such as Brown and Goodridge not only mandate changes in 
the abstract, but they inspire activists to take concrete steps to implement 
them, thus further inciting political backlash. After the decisions in both 
Brown I and Brown II, the NAACP urged southern blacks to petition school 
boards for immediate desegregation on threat of litigation.355 Blacks filed 
such petitions in hundreds of southern localities,  including in the Deep 
South. In a few cities, such as Baton Rouge and Montgomery, blacks even 
showed up in person to try to register their children at white schools.356 In 
the mid- 1950s, but for Brown, such challenges would have been inconceiv­
able in the Deep South, where race relations had been least affected by 
broad forces for racial change. One might have predicted that a campaign 
for racial reform there would have begun with voting rights or the equaliza­
tion of black schools, not with school desegregation, which was hardly the 
top priority of most blacks and was more likely to incite violent white resis­
tance. Merely si,gning one's name to a school desegregation petition was an 
act of courage for blacks in the Deep South, and it frequently incited eco­
nomic reprisals and occasionally physical violence.357 The petition campaign 
contributed significantly to the rise of massive resistance in the mid- 1950s; 
black efforts to implement Brown stimulated more resistance than did the 
352. Dao, supra note 267. 
353. Kaplan, supra note 202; see also Breslau, supra note 240, at 43 (quoting the spokesman 
for the Defense of Marriage Coalition, Tim Nashif, "(p]eople are three times more passionate on this 
issue than they were even about abortion," and noting that the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force 
admits that voters opposed to same-sex marriage are four times more likely to vote according to a 
candidate's position on the issue than are those who favor it or who profess neutrality). 
354. Cf Thomas Oliphant, Op-Ed, The Gay Ma"iage Deception, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 7, 
2004, at D 1 1  (noting the paradox that even though exit polls showed that sixty percent of the public 
supports either same-sex marriage or civil unions, eight of the state marriage initiatives that passed 
barred legal recognition of either relationship and attributing this disconnect to deception in the way 
that advocates presented the amendments). 
355. KLARMAN, supra note 1 1 , at 368. 
356. Id. 
357. Id. at 368-69. 
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decision itself.358 As the Daily News of Jackson, Mississippi, editorialized, 
"there is only one way to meet the attack of the NAACP. Organized aggres­
sion must be met by organized resistance."359 
Goodridge had a similar effect. Inspired by the ruling of the Massachu­
setts court, thousands of same-sex couples applied for and received marriage 
licenses in San Francisco and in Multnomah County, Oregon, and smaller 
numbers did so in several other cities across the nation.360 Office-holders in 
local communities where public opinion supported same-sex marriage had 
obvious incentives to grant such licenses; their defiance of higher authority 
converted them into local heroes361 (much as southern governors such as 
Orval Faubus and George Wallace became virtually unbeatable politically 
by defying federal-court integration orders after Brown362).  For example, 
Mayor Newsom, who had won a narrow victory in the San Francisco may­
oral election in December 2003, saw his approval ratings rise to a staggering 
eighty-five percent after he ordered local officials to begin issuing marriage 
licenses in February 2004.363 As the threat that same-sex marriage would 
expand beyond the boundaries of Massachusetts became real, opponents 
mobilized behind state and federal constitutional amendments to limit mar­
riage to unions between men and women.364 
358. Id. 
359. Report of the Secretary for the Months of July and August 1 955, at 5 (Sept. 1 2, 1955), 
microformed on Papers of the NAACP, supp. to pt. I, reel 2, frame 786 (Univ. Publ'ns of Am.). 
360. See supra notes 230-233 and accompanying text. 
361 .  See, e.g., Crampton, supra note 23 1 (reporting that Mayor West of New Paltz, who began 
issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples, addressed rallies, gave speeches reminiscent of the 
civil rights movement of the 1960s, and declared himself willing to go to jail for the cause); cf Dean 
Murphy, California Court Rules Gay Unions Have No Standing, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1 3, 2004, at A l  
(noting the mayor of San Francisco, Gavin Newsom, defending his decision to grant marriage li­
censes to same-sex couples as "right and appropriate" even after the California Supreme Court had 
slapped him down and declared the licenses to be "void and of no legal effect").  
362. KLARMAN, supra note 1 1 ,  at 398, 405-06. 
363. Rachel Gordon, Newsom Sheds Wonk Image-Takes it to the Streets, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 
22, 2004, at A l . 
Newsom won the election with just fifty-three percent of the vote against a candidate of the 
Green Party, Matt Gonzales, who outflanked Newsom on the left. Id. In his concession speech, 
Gonzales warned, "When Mayor Newsom is wrong, we'll be there to oppose him." John Wilder­
muth, S.F. leftists Warily Ask if Newsom Is for Real, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 5, 2004, at A l .  After 
Newsom issued his marriage order, a spokesman of the Green Party declared, "Gavin Newsom's 
stand on gay marriage made us all proud," and a local Democratic pollster said, "Newsom has 
earned the respect of many progressives and liberals." Id. Newsom also quickly became one of 
America's best-known mayors, appearing on national television programs such as Good Morning 
America, Larry King Live, and Nightline, and Newsweek magazine named him one of America's top 
ten Democrats. Ilene Lelchuk, Newsom, Unbowed by Decision, Says He is 'More Resolved', S.F. 
CHRON., Aug. 1 3, 2004, at A l5.  By the summer of 2004, his local approval ratings had shot up to 
eighty-five percent. Id. 
364. Bob Egelko, S.F. Gay Marriages Head to Court, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 2 1 ,  2004, at A l  
(noting that the "highly visible City Hall weddings, and San Francisco's libertine reputation, helped 
to fuel the successful campaigns for anti-gay-marriage amendments in 1 1  states last month, includ­
ing Ohio, where turnout for the ballot measure may have tipped the crucial state to Bush"); 
Greenberger, supra note 238 (noting that conservative activists and some Democrats are pointing to 
the Massachusetts supreme court decision, together with the images of gay weddings in San Fran­
cisco, as a key reason for Kerry's Joss). 
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After the 2004 election, many prominent Democrats blamed Mayor 
Newsom of San Francisco for providing conservatives with an issue to rally 
around.365 Senator Dianne Feinstein of California observed that the thou­
sands of same-sex weddings in San Francisco "energize[d] a very 
conservative vote" and that the "whole issue has been too much, too fast, too 
soon. And people aren't ready for it."366 Representative Barney Frank of 
Massachusetts, one of the few openly gay representatives in the U.S. Con­
gress, said that Newsom had "helped to galvanize Mr. Bush's conservative 
supporters in those states by playing into people's fears of same-sex wed­
dings."367 A lawyer for the Alliance Defense Fund, a Christian group that 
sued to block the same-sex marriages in California, concurred with these 
assessments, calling the court decisions the "triggers" but noting that Mayor 
Newsom had "definitely accelerated the reaction" by providing imajes of 
gay and lesbian couples embracing and celebrating their marriages.36 Karl 
Rove had to a stifle a grin when asked after the election whether he was in­
debted to Mayor Newsom for opening City Hall to same-sex marriages.369 
Thus, the most significant short-term consequence of Goodridge, as 
with Brown, may have been the political backlash that it inspired.370 By out­
pacing public opinion on issues of social reform, such rulings mobilize 
opponents, undercut moderates, and retard the cause they purport to ad­
vance. And while the violent southern backlash produced by Brown 
generated a counterbacklash in northern opinion, in the wake of Goodridge 
gays and lesbians have not faced the sort of pervasive public violence that 
outrages moderates and turns the tide of public opinion once and for all.371 
365. See, e.g. , Pam B elluck, Maybe Same-Sex Marriage Didn 't Make the Difference, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 7, 2004, at 05; Mehren, supra note 268; Mittelstadt, supra note 304; see also Blame it 
on San Francisco?, S.F. CttRON., Nov, 8, 2004, at B6 (reluctantly conceding some validity to the 
theory that the seeds of President Bush's victory were planted in San Francisco in February, as the 
scenes of thousands of gay couples marrying "caused more of a jolt to heartland sensibilities than 
many folks here realized at the time"). 
366. Belluck, supra note 365. 
367. Dean E. Murphy, Some Democrats Blame One of Their Own, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2004, 
at A l 2; see also Wheatley, supra note 277 (noting that those, like the author, who had succumbed 
earlier in the year "to a giddy and gleeful inflation of pride" when gay couples lined up in San Fran­
cisco to get married, must now face the "harsh reality" that they had "grossly miscalculated" and 
that their "gambit for marriage was a resounding failure"). 
368. Murphy, supra note 367; see also Anthony B. Robinson, Making Sense of Moral Sur­
prise During the 2004 Election, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 14, 2004, at F l  (calling 
Mayor Newsom "the Republicans' secret weapon in 2004"). 
369. Adam Nagoumey, Moral Values Carried Bush, Rove Says, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2004, 
at A20. 
370. See Rosen, Immodest Proposal, supra note 4 1 ,  at 1 9  ("By trying to impose gay marriage 
by judicial fiat, the Massachusetts court may set back the cause of gay and lesbian equality rather 
than advance it."); Stuart Taylor, Jr., Gay Marriage Isn 't an Issue for the Courts to Decide, NAT'L J., 
Nov. 22, 2003, at 3557 ('The backlash [Goodridge] has provoked could conceivably prove powerful 
enough to set back the gay-rights movement for decades."). 
3 7 1 .  But cf Meet the Press: Arnold Schwarzenegger (NBC television broadcast Feb. 22, 2004) 
(Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger reporting on "riots" in San Francisco over same-sex marriage 
and predicting, "The next thing we know . . .  there are injured or there are dead people"). 
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V. THE FUTURE 
Alexander Bickel, the preeminent constitutional law scholar of the 
1960s, once described the Warren Court's landmark rulings as predictions of 
the future.372 Other scholars have likewise depicted path-breaking Court de­
cisions such as Roe v. Wade373 and Furman v. Georgia374 as efforts by the 
Justices to put the Court on the right side of history.375 Other commentators 
have objected that even if such descriptions are accurate, to defend such a 
soothsaying role for the Court is normatively problematic.376 
Brown and Lawrence share a characteristic pertaining to this debate: On 
both the issues of racial equality and gay rights, public opinion was in­
tensely divided at the time of the Court's ruling, but future trends were not 
difficult to predict. In the Justices' conference deliberations on Brown, 
Stanley Reed predicted that racial segregation would disappear in the border 
states within fifteen or twenty years, even without judicial intervention.377 
Justice Jackson similarly observed that "segregation is nearing an end."378 
Given the propensity of constitutional law to suppress outliers,379 such a shift 
in social practices might have guaranteed an eventual judicial ruling against 
segregation. A subsequent generation of Justices, finding segregation even 
more abhorrent than their predecessors had, would have been sorely tempted 
to apply an ascendant national norm against segregation to shrinking num­
bers of holdout states. This is probably what Justice Jackson had in mind 
372. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 1 2- 1 3  ( 1970) 
(noting that the Warren Court "bet on the future" and "relied on events for vindication"); see also id. 
at 99 ("the Justices of the Warren Court placed their own bet on the future"); id. at 173-74 (noting 
the Warren Court's "confident reliance on the intuitive judicial capacity to identify the course of 
progress"). 
373. 410 U.S. 1 1 3 ( 1973). 
374. 408 U.S. 238 ( 1972). 
375. Furman, 408 U.S. at 3 1 3  (White, J., concurring) (observing that the death penalty "has 
for all practical purposes run its course"); JOHN c. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 
4 13-14 (1 994) (noting that the Justices in Furman thought that capital punishment was on the way 
out and that they were offering a "nudge" toward extinction); see also id. at 352 (portraying Roe v. 
Wade as an effort by Supreme Court Justices "to anticipate popular sentiment" and as a product of 
their "vision of the future and . . .  [their] confidence in their own foresight"); THE SUPREME COURT 
IN CONFERENCE, supra note 15,  at 6 1 7  (reproducing the conference notes in Furman v. Georgia, 
with Justice Brennan noting that support for abolition of the death penalty has increased throughout 
the twentieth century and Justice Stewart predicting that "[s]omeday the Court will hold that the 
death sentence is unconstitutional"). 
376. JoHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 69-70 ( 1980) (noting that "there is no 
reason to suppose that judges are well qualified to foresee the future development of popular opin­
ion," that the enterprise of predicting the future "is antidemocratic on its face," and that "by 
predicting the future the Justices will unavoidably help shape it"). 
377. William 0. Douglas, Conference Notes, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., (Dec. 1 3 ,  1 952) (on file 
with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Douglas Papers, Box 1 1 50). 
378. Id. 
379. See, e.g., THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PvBLIC OPINION AND THE SUPREME COURT 84-85, 
1 88 ( 1989); LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 489-94 (2000); 
Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1 ,  
1 6- 1 7  ( 1 996). 
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when he declared in his draft concurring opinion in Brown that "[ w ]hatever 
we might say today, within a generation [racial segregation] will be out­
lawed by decision of this Court."380 
The future may be even easier to predict with regard to gay rights. Al­
though the election results in 2004 confirm that most Americans are not yet 
ready for same-sex marriage, on other gay-rights issues the trend is plainly 
in the direction of expanded rights. In 2004, voters in Cincinnati overturned 
a city ordinance adopted ten years earlier that had barred the city council 
from �assing any laws giving "minority or protected status" to gays and les­
bians. 8 1 In both North Carolina and Idaho, states not normally considered 
strong bastions of gay rights, voters elected their first openly gay state legis­
lators, and voters in Dallas County, Texas elected as sheriff an openly 
lesbian Democrat-the first woman ever to hold the post and the first De­
mocrat to do so in nearly three decades.382 On January 1 ,  2005, the nation's 
most far-reaching domestic partnership law went into effect in California, 
granting nearly all the rights of married couples to thousands of same-sex 
partners.383 Moreover, despite election results revealing powerful public op­
position to same-sex marriage, lower courts--even in socially conservative 
states-have continued to expand gay rights in other contexts. In December 
2004, a state court in Arkansas invalidated a regulation banning gays and 
lesbians from serving as foster parents, 384 and the Montana Supreme Court 
ruled that public universities in the state were constitutionally obliged to 
provide gay employees with insurance coverage for domestic partners.385 
The demographics of public opinion on issues of sexual orientation vir­
tually ensure that one day in the not-too-distant future a substantial majority 
of Americans will support same-sex marriage386: young people are much 
380. Robert H. Jackson, Draft Memorandum, supra note 29, at I .  
3 8 1 .  Christopher Lisotta, Six Reasons Why November 2 Wasn't a Total Gay Political Night-
mare, L.A. WKLY., Dec. 24, 2004, atA20. 
382. Lisotta, supra note 38 1 .  
383. Egelko, supra note 364. 
384. Judgment at I ,  Memorandum Opinion at 18,  Howard v. Child Welfare Agency Review 
Bd., No. CV 1 999-9881 (Ark. Cir. Ct. Dec. 29, 2004). The court invalidated the regulation under the 
Equal Protection Clause, while denying that gays constituted a suspect class. 
385. Snetsinger v. Mont. Univ. Sys., 104 P.3d 445 (Mont. 2004). The basis of the decision was 
that Montana discriminated against same-sex couples by allowing only opposite-sex couples to 
qualify through common-law marriage for partnership benefits. Id. at 452. The court went out of its 
way to deny that it was calling into question the state's limitation of marriage to unions between a 
man and a woman. Id. at 452-53. 
386. Canada 's Celebration of Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, June 1 9, 2003, at A24 (noting that the 
movement toward accepting same-sex marriage in the United States "will be unstoppable in time, 
whatever the pace proves to be"); Frank Rich, And Now, the Queer Eye for the Straight Marriage, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2003, at B I  (noting the University of Chicago historian George Chauncy con­
fidently predicting "the steady decline in opposition to same-sex marriage"); Right-to-Marry Battle 
Continues, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 2 1 ,  2004, at B8 ("There is no question that the concept of same-sex 
marriage is gaining acceptance, despite the success of resolutions against it in 1 1  states last Novem­
ber."); Rosen, supra note 200, at 50 (noting that "two-thirds of Americans now say they believe that 
same-sex marriage will be legal within the next hundred years"). 
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more likely to support gay rights than are their elders.387 Indeed, a poll taken 
in June 2003 showed that sixty-one percent of respondents aged eighteen to 
twenty-nine already supported the legalization of same-sex marriage, while 
among those aged 65 and over just twenty-two percent did so.388 There is 
little reason to believe that as people get older, their attitudes on such issues 
become more conservative (unlike attitudes toward wealth redistribution, 
which do become more conservative as people age and acquire more prop­
erty). As an older generation holding more traditional views about sexual 
orientation fades from the scene and today's youth become tomorrow's poli­
cymakers, same-sex marriage will become increasingly accepted.389 
Indeed, exit polls conducted in the 2004 election revealed that about 
sixty percent of Americans already support either marriage or civil unions 
for same-sex couples, and President Bush clarified just before the election 
that he did not oppose states recognizing civil unions.390 The shift in public 
opinion on this issue within just a few years has been truly astonishing,391 
and it may suggest that the growing power and pervasiveness of popular 
culture is likely to cause public attitudes on sexual orientation to shift faster 
than racial and gender attitudes changed in preceding generations.392 At 
some point, the Court is likely to constitutionalize a newly emerging con­
sensus and invalidate bans on same-sex marriage, much as the Justices 
387. Sullivan, supra note 273, at 1 1 . 
388. Linda Lyons, U.S. Next Down the Aisle Toward Gay Marriage?, GALLUP Pon TuESDAY 
BRIEFING, July 22, 2003. 
389. Evans, supra note 306 (quoting Evan Wolfson, executive director of the Freedom to 
Marry Project: "No civil rights movement advances without ups and downs and some difficult 
patches. What is most important is that young people, regardless of their political affiliation, over­
whelmingly support ending this discrimination."); Robin Toner, The Culture Wars, Part //, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 29, 2004, § 4, at 1 (quoting Democratic pollster Anna Greenberg observing, "it's really 
likely in 10 or 20 years that people won't understand what all the fuss was about" and "[t)here's a 
whole generation of people growing up who just don't think about these issues in the same way"). 
390. Gary Langer, A Question of Values, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2004, at 19; Sullivan, supra note 
273; Zemike, supra note 264; see also Steve Chapman, Our No. I Moral Value ls Still 'Live and Let 
Live ', BALT. SUN, Nov. 9, 2004, at ISA (noting a Washington Post-ABC poll in 2004 finding that 
fifty-four percent of respondents supported civil unions while only forty-two percent opposed them). 
391 .  Chapman, supra note 390 (noting that today a majority support civil unions, which a 
couple of years ago were "a radical concept"); Michael Kinsley, A Gay Marriage Success Story, 
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 1 2, 2004, at MS (noting the extraordinary rapidity with which same-sex marriage 
has gone from being a novel idea to being seriously debated); Kirkpatrick & Zezima, supra note 307 
(reporting a statement by Cheryl Jacques of the Human Rights Campaign noting that a few years 
ago people were scared to death of civil unions, whereas now that policy represents the political safe 
ground); Peter Steinfels, Beliefs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2004, at A l S  (noting that "civil unions, which 
stirred shock and fury in Vermont only a few years ago, have almost reached the stage of being 
mainstream"); Sullivan, supra note 273; see also Lyons, supra note 388 (noting that when Gallup 
first asked the question whether Americans supported same-sex marriage in 1996, only twenty­
seven percent answered yes, but by 2003 that number had increased to thirty-nine percent); Eliza­
beth Mehren, Voters Oust 5 Who Backed Civil Union Law, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2000, at A23 
(noting a clear backlash against civil unions in Vermont in the 2000 elections, with five incumbent 
Republicans who had supported civil-union legislation being defeated in primary elections by social 
conservatives). 
392. Kinsley, supra note 391 ;  see also Sunstein, supra note S2, at 29 (noting that dramatic shifts 
in attitudes regarding sexual orientation have been taking place "in an extraordinarily short time"). 
486 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 104:43 1 
struck down restnctions on interracial marriage in Loving v. Virginia 
( 1967)393 after the civil rights movement had rendered anachronistic that last 
formal vestige of Jim Crow.394 
To be sure, predicting the future can be fraught with peril. When the Su­
preme Court invalidated abortion restrictions in Roe v. Wade and cast doubt 
upon the constitutionality of the death penalty in Funnan v. Georgia, the 
Justices were probably imagining a future in which public opinion would 
have continued to move in the same direction that the Court was pushing.395 
Suffice it to say that on both occasions the Justices' prediction proved mis­
taken. Over the next three decades, public opinion on abortion changed very 
little from what it had been in 1973.396 Public o�inion on the death penalty 
shifted quickly and powerfully against the Court. 97 
Still, some predictions seem safer than others. The age disparities re­
vealed by public opinion polls on issues of sexual orientation are so 
dramatic that only an unforeseeable event of enormous magnitude could 
disrupt the movement toward greater tolerance. Even some conservatives 
who oppose same-sex marriage admit, when pressed, that they regard it as 
probably inevitable.398 As Cheryl Jacques, then head of the Human Rights 
Campaign, noted after the 2004 elections, "[ w ]e lost a battle, but we are 
. . th ,,399 wmnmg e war. 
393. 388 U.S. 1 ( 1967). 
394. Cf Bigotry and Ballots, supra note 273 (noting that the same-sex marriage issue helped 
reelect President Bush but taking solace in the fact that bans on interracial marriage were supported 
until recently); see also Lelchuk, supra note 363 (noting Mayor Newsom of San Francisco predict­
ing, immediately after the California supreme court voided the same-sex marriages he had earlier 
authorized, that eventually San Francisco's stand would prevail, much as civil rights activists ulti­
mately succeeded at ending bans on interracial marriage). 
395. See supra note 375. 
396. Gallup Poll, Mar. 8-18, 1 974, Public Opinion Online, The Roper Center, University of 
Connecticut, accession # 0045804, available at Westlaw, Public Opinion Online Database (reporting 
that forty-seven percent of Americans supported Roe v. Wade and forty-four percent opposed it); 
Gallup Poll, Mar. 26-28, 2001 ,  The Roper Center, University of Connecticut, Public Opinion 
Online, accession # 0380244, available at Westlaw, Public Opinion Online Database (reporting that 
forty-seven percent of Americans consider themselves pro-choice, as opposed to forty-one percent 
who consider themselves pro-life). 
397. STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 267 (2002) (noting that 
the "decision of Furman . . .  touched off the biggest flurry of capital punishment legislation the 
nation had ever seen"); JEFFRIES, supra note 375, at 414 (reporting Gallup polls and concluding that 
the increase in public support for the death penalty after Furman was "so sharp that it seems almost 
certain to have been a negative reaction to the Court's decision"); Carole S. Steiker & Jordan M. 
Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capi­
tal Punishment, 1 09 HARV. L. REV. 355, 4 1 1-12 (1995) ("[I]t seems fair to say that Furman 
galvanized political opposition to abolition . . . .  "). 
398. E.g., Lyons, supra note 388 (quoting Michael J. McManus, founder of Marriage Savers, 
who said, when asked if same-sex marriage was inevitable, "My answer, alas, is probably."). 
399. Greenberger, supra note 238; see also Blame it on San Francisco?, supra note 365 (con­
tending that even though the same-sex marriage issue may have helped President Bush win 
reelection, "[t]ime is on the side of the bold leaders who are willing to confront discrimination 
[against gays] in clear and compelling terms"). 
December 2005] Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge) 487 
VI. CONCLUSION: THE COURT' S LEGITIMACY 
Supreme Court Justices sometimes claim that the Court's legitimacy de­
rives from its ability to demonstrate that its rulings are based on sound legal 
principles rather than political calculations or personal preferences. In reaf­
firming the Court's landmark abortion-rights decision, Roe v. Wade, the 
plurality opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Case/00 declared that "[t]he underlying substance of [the Court's] legiti­
macy is of course the warrant for the Court's decisions in the Constitution 
and the lesser sources of legal principle on which the Court draws."401 Fur­
ther, the plurality stated, "[A] decision without principled justification 
would be no judicial act at all,"402 and "[t]he Court must take care to speak 
and act in ways that allow people to accept its decisions on the terms the 
Court claims for them, as grounded truly in principle, not as compromises 
with social and political pressures . . . .  "403 
In the 1950s, critics assailed Brown v. Board of Education as unprinci­
pled judicial activism. Southern whites charged the Court with ignoring 
precedent, transgressing original intent, indulging in sociology, infringing 
on the reserved rights of states, and usurping legislative authority.404 One 
prominent newspaper editor in the South, James J. Kilpatrick, stated a typi­
cal view: "In May of 1954, that inept fraternity of politicians and professors 
known as the United States Supreme Court chose to throw away the estab­
lished law. These nine men repudiated the Constitution, sp[a]t upon the 
tenth amendment, and rewrote the fundamental law of this land to suit their 
own gauzy concepts of sociology."405 
White southerners who sympathized with racial segregation were not the 
only critics of Brown. Some eminent jurists and law professors who con­
demned white supremacy also attacked the Court's reasoning. In 1958 Judge 
Learned Hand stated, "I have never been able to understand on what basis 
[Brown] does or can rest except as a coup de main,"406 and the following 
year Professor Herbert Wechsler castigated the Court for failing to justify its 
decision in Brown on the basis of any "neutral principle."407 Indeed, several 
of the Justices themselves seemed unconvinced that Brown rested on a 
sound legal basis. Justice Jackson, for example, conceded that he could not 
400. 505 U.S. 833 ( 1 992) (plurality opinion). 
401 .  Id. at 865. 
402. Id. 
403. Id. 
404. KLARMAN, supra note 1 1 , at 367-68 (citing relevant sources). 
405. Court Order Gets Varied Reaction from Region 's Newspapers, So. SCH. NEws (Nashville), 
June 8, 1955, at 8, 9. 
406. LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 55 ( J 958). 
407. WECHSLER, supra note 54, at 32-34. 
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"justify the abolition of segregation as a judicial act," but he agreed to "go 
along with it" as "a political decision.',408 
In the fifty years since it was decided, Brown has become an American 
icon. Almost everyone regards the decision as right.409 No constitutional the­
ory is taken seriously unless it can accommodate the result in Brown.410 
Aspiring jurists who dared to question the soundness of Brown could not 
possibly survive Senate confirmation hearings.41 1  In 1 987, Judge Robert 
Bork criticized the Court's sexual-privacy decision, Griswold v. Connecti­
cut,412 and its landmark reapportionment ruling, Reynolds v. Sims,413 but he 
emphasized his support for Brown.414 This seismic shift in Brown's status­
from a much-criticized ruling that divided public opinion to a sacrosanct 
decision that is well-nigh universally applauded-may suggest that the 
Court's legitimacy flows less from the soundness of its legal reasoning than 
from its ability to predict future trends in public opinion.415 
La,wrence v. Texas may one day have a similar history. Contemporary 
critics of that decision have accused the Justices of engaging in unprincipled 
activism, ignoring federalism and history, and inventing constitutional rights 
that have no foundation in the traditional sources of constitutional law.416 
408. Harold H. Burton, Conference Notes, Segregation Cases (Dec. 13, 1952) (on file with 
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Burton Papers, Box 244). 
409. See, e.g. , JEFFRIES, supra note 375, at 330 (stating that Brown "is universally approved as 
both right and necessary[;] [m]ore powerful than any academic theory of constitutional interpreta­
tion is the legend of Brown"). 
410. See, e.g., ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF 
THE LAW 77 ( 1 990) (stating that "any theory that seeks acceptance must, as a matter of psychologi­
cal fact, if not of logical necessity, account for the result in Brown"); Michael W. McConnell, 
Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REv. 947, 952 (1995) (noting that any 
theory unable to accommodate Brown "is seriously discredited"). 
41 1 .  See, e.g., Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Nomination of William H. Rehnquist to be 
Chief Justice of the United States, S. EXEC. REP. No. 1 18, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., at 25-26 ( 1986) 
(reproducing a 1971 letter from William Rehnquist to Senator James Eastland denying that views 
hostile to the result in Brown expressed in a memorandum he authored as law clerk to Justice Jack­
son during the 1 952 term were his own, and stating, "I . . .  unequivocally . . .  support the legal 
reasoning and the rightness from the standpoint of fundamental fairness of the Brown decision"). 
412. Nomination of Rohen H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Coun of the United 
States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, l OOth Cong. 1 16 ( 1987) ("[T]he right 
of privacy, as defined or undefined by Justice Douglas, was a free-floating right that was not derived 
in a principled fashion from constitutional materials."). 
413.  Id. at 1 57 ("There is nothing in our constitutional history that suggests one man, one vote 
is the only proper way of apportioning . . . .  [l]t does not come out of anything in the Constitution 
. . . .  ") 
414. Id. at 104 ("Brown, delivered with the authority of a unanimous Court, was clearly cor­
rect and represents perhaps the greatest moral achievement of our constitutional law."). 
415 .  Cf Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 
1 28 1 ,  1 3 1 6  ( 1976) (observing that "the power of judicial action to generate assent over the long haul 
[is] the ultimate touchstone[] of legitimacy"). 
4 16. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 603 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing 
the majority for the "invention of a brand-new 'constitutional right'"  and for subverting the democ­
ratic process); Lund & McGinnis, supra note 44, at 1 557, 1 575 (condemning Lawrence as "a 
paragon of the most anti constitutional branch of constitutional law: substantive due process," which 
"displays a dismissive contempt for both the Constitution and the work of prior Courts" and "simply 
December 2005) Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge) 489 
Lawrence's critics sound many of the same notes that Brown's critics did 
fifty years earlier. Yet, as we have seen, the demographics of public opinion 
on sexual-orientation issues suggest dramatic changes in the near future. 
Those changes have already been sufficient to lead a majority of Justices to 
discard Bowers v. Hardwick.411 It may not be too much longer before Bowers 
comes to resemble Plessy v. Ferguson418--one of the most vilified decisions 
in the Court's history-and Lawrence evolves into the Brown of the twenty­
first century. Then, the Court's legitimacy will have been even further en­
hanced by virtue of the Justices having rightly predicted the future on 
another great issue of social reform. 
abandons legal analysis"); Dean E. Murphy, Gays Celebrate, and Plan Campaign for Broader 
Rights, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2003, at A20 (quoting Virginia Attorney General Jerry W. Kilgore 
criticizing Lawrence for undermining the state's "right to pass legislation that reflects the views and 
values of our citizens"). 
4 1 7. 478 U.S. 1 86 (1986). 
4 1 8. 1 63 U.S. 537 ( 1896). 
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